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Cyber-physical systems (CPS) such as automobiles, power plants, avionics systems, unmanned
vehicles, medical devices, manufacturing and home automation systems have distinct cyber and
physical components that must work cohesively with each other to ensure correct operation. Many
cyber-physical applications have “real-time” constraints, i.e., they must function correctly within
predetermined time scales. A failure to protect these systems could result in significant harm to
humans, the system or even the environment. While traditionally such systems were isolated from
external accesses and used proprietary components and protocols, modern CPS use off-the-shelf
components and are increasingly interconnected, often via networks such as the Internet. As a
result, they are exposed to additional attack surfaces and have become increasingly vulnerable to
cyber attacks. Enhancing security for real-time CPS, however, is not an easy task due to limited
resource availability (e.g., processing power, memory, storage, energy) and stringent timing/safety
requirements. Security monitoring techniques for cyber-physical platforms (a) must execute with
existing real-time tasks, (b) operate without impacting the timing and safety constraints of the
control logic and (c) have to be designed and executed in a way that an adversary cannot easily
evade it. The objective of my research is to increase security posture of embedded real-time
CPS by integrating monitoring/detection techniques that defeat cyber attacks without violating
timing/safety constraints of existing tasks. My dissertation work explores the real-time security
domain and shows that by employing a combination of multiple scheduling/analysis techniques and
interactions between hardware/software-based security extensions, it becomes feasible to integrate
security monitoring mechanisms in real-time CPS without compromising timing/safety requirements
of existing tasks. In this research, I (a) develop techniques to raise the responsiveness of security
monitoring tasks by increasing their frequency of execution, (b) design a hardware-supported
framework to prevent falsification of actuation commands — i.e., commands that control the state
of the physical system and (c) propose metrics to trade-off security with real-time guarantees. The
solutions presented in this dissertation require minimal changes to system components/parameters
and thus compatible for legacy systems. My proposed frameworks and results are evaluated through
both, simulations and experiments on real off-the-shelf cyber-physical platforms. The development
of analysis techniques and design frameworks proposed in this dissertation will inherently make
such systems more secure and hence, safer. I believe my dissertation work will bring researchers
and system engineers one step closer to understand how to integrate two seemingly diverse yet
important fields — real-time CPS and cyber-security — while gaining a better understanding of
both areas.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) such as avionics, nuclear power plants, automobiles, space vehicles,
power generation and distribution systems, medical devices, industrial robots have been in existence
for decades. Such systems, which often have safety-critical properties and real-time (i.e., stringent
timing) requirements. Any problems in real-time systems (RTS) could result in significant harm to
humans, the system or even the environment. Systems with real-time requirements need to function
correctly, but within their predefined timing constraints, often termed as “deadlines”. For example,
consider real-time CPS applications with stringent timing constraints such as deployment of a car’s
airbag or an industrial robot operates on a manufacturing conveyor line. A typical window for
an airbag deployment (time between detection of collision and final airbag operations) is around
50–60 ms [1] and the response time for robot movements (i.e., placing and moving objects on the













Figure 1.1: Timeliness requirements of real-time systems.
If real-time applications failed to comply with their timing requirements (deadlines), the
usefulness of results produced by the system drops sharply (see Fig. 1.1). From the earlier airbag
deployment and manufacturing robot example, if the application tasks fail to deploy the airbag in
time or there is a delay to update the angle of rotation of the robot arm, the physical system may
not work properly and hence put the safety of the human operators at risk. This is different from
general-purpose systems where the usefulness drops in a more gradual manner (e.g., a web service
may tolerate a few millisecond delay without degrading user experience significantly). Some of the
common properties and assumptions related to RTS are as follows: (i) stringent timing and safety
requirements, (ii) implemented as a system of periodic tasks, (iii) worst-case bounds are known
for most loops as well as the critical pieces of code, (iv) no dynamically loaded or self-modifying
code, (v) recursion is either not used or statically bounded and (vi) memory and processing power
often limited.
Figure 1.2 presents a high-level illustration of a real-time CPS. Each real-time application in
the system (called “task”) represents a time-critical function and a collection of such tasks are
hosted on a hardware platform. The scheduler in real-time operating system (RTOS) uses timers
and interrupt handlers to enforce timing guarantees at runtime. This ability of the scheduler to

























Figure 1.2: Abstraction of a real-time CPS node with common uses cases.
the system. Access to shared platform resources (such as caches, buses, memory) is regulated using
resource sharing protocols to ensure data consistency and bounds on waiting time so that deadlines
can be met. The communication network in RTS is required to provide service with low jitters and
meet end-to-end message deadline for all messages.
Although safety and fault-tolerance have long been important design focus in such systems,
security has rarely been a consideration in the design of real-time CPS mainly due to beliefs such as:
(a) RTS lack inherent value to adversaries (“why would anyone attack them?”), (b) the prevalence
of custom hardware/software/protocols will deter attackers (“these protocols/hardware/software
are secret and so arcane that no one can decipher them”) and also (c) the lack of computing
power and memory in these systems will throttle potential adversarial actions (“what can they do
even if they get in?”). While traditionally RTS adopted proprietary protocols, platforms, software
and were air-gapped (i.e., not connected to the outside world), with the advent of newer domains
such as autonomous vehicles, drones, remote monitoring and control and Internet-of-Things (IoT)-
specific applications, RTS find themselves front and center in modern society. Since many RTS now
use commodity-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and are often connected to each other or even
the Internet, they expose additional attack surfaces, often overturning all of the aforementioned
beliefs. A number of high-profile attacks on real systems (e.g., Stuxnet [3], BlackEnergy [4]), attack
demonstrations by researchers on automobiles [5, 6] and medical devices [7] have shown that the
threat is real and systems composed of RTS might be vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Given the time and resource constraints under which RTS operate, vulnerabilities in RTS differ
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considerably from those of traditional enterprise systems. Threats faced by RTS could vary in scope
and effect; from the leakage of critical data [8] to hostile actions due to lack of authentication [5, 6, 9].
However, simply adding security mechanisms that provide confidentiality (e.g., encryption),
integrity protection (e.g., message authentication) and availability (e.g., replication) without
considering the real-time and embedded nature of such systems will not be effective. In the
last few years there has been a lot of focus on securing critical CPS [10–18]. A major focus
of such work has been on securing communication protocols and on monitoring and detection
mechanisms at the network and application level. Given the increasing cyber-attack risks, however,
it is essential to have a layered defense and integrate resilience against cyber attacks into the design
of controllers and actuators (i.e., embedded RTS). It is also critical to retrofit existing controllers
and actuators with protection, detection, survival and recovery mechanisms. In addition, stringent
timing constraints severely inhibit how security solutions can be added to RTS; for instance, the
protection methods should not cause timing problems in RTS.
Integrating security techniques in real-time CPS, however, is not an easy task since they have
stringent timing and safety constraints — hence a security mechanism must not violate these
requirements. Any security mechanisms have to co-exist with the real-time tasks in the system.
However, stringent timing constraints in RTS introduce complexities — the strict deadlines for the
real-time tasks may not allow for frequent execution of security mechanisms. Unlike in conventional
IT settings, it may not be possible to execute the detection/monitoring tasks for arbitrary lengths
of time. Designers of the systems are required to balance between security requirements (e.g.,
having enough cycles for effective monitoring detection) and the timing/safety requirements (i.e.,
not interfere with real-time deadlines). Further, it may not be feasible for legacy systems to adjust
the parameters (such as run-times, period and execution order) of real-time tasks to accommodate
security techniques. For example, how often and how long should a monitoring and detection task
run to be effective but not interfere with real-time control or other safety-critical tasks? Integrating
security into multicore real-time platforms is more challenging when compared to the single core
systems since designers have multiple choices across cores to retrofit security mechanisms. While
this real-time vs. security trade-offs could potentially be addressed for newer systems at design
time, this is especially challenging for retrofitting legacy systems where the real-time tasks are
already in place and perhaps cannot be modified. An understanding of the interplay between
real-time constraints and the security requirements is very important for properly integrating the
two fields. The focus of my research is to develop techniques that will allow us to trade back and
forth between these, seemingly, conflicting properties so that designers of the systems can correctly
gauge system requirements — hence, perhaps, meeting both, the real-time constraints as well as
integrating effective security mechanisms.
My dissertation work presents design-time frameworks for integrating security monitoring
mechanisms into real-time CPS without violating timing/safety constraints. In particular, I study
and develop models for integrating monitoring and detection mechanisms into legacy (i.e., existing)
real-time CPS built using both, single and multicore processors. The security mechanisms to
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be integrated could be any detection/protection/recovery mechanism depending on the system
requirements — for instance, an intrusion detection task or a trusted module that checks specific
system signals (such as filesystems, network packets, actuation commands). As part of this research
I analyze the various parameters that affect design choices while integrating security into RTS. I
further develop metrics that will enable us to measure success and objectively analyze different
solutions.1 I also evaluate my solutions on a variety of platforms — from simulation engines to real
hardware, viz., a ground rover, a flight controller, a infusion pump and a robotic arm.
1.1 THESIS STATEMENT
As mentioned earlier, integrating security in real-time CPS is not straightforward since
monitoring/detection mechanisms must (a) co-execute with existing real-time tasks, (b) comply
with timing/safety constraints and (c) designed/scheduled in a way that an adversary cannot easily
evade them. The real-time security solutions are constrained to address the following challenges:
1. How do we integrate and then characterize the effects of security in real-time CPS those
designed using both, single and multicore chips?
2. What are the trade-offs on the security and timing requirements while guaranteeing no (or
minimal) perturbations for the real-time properties?
3. What are the performance criteria and metrics that need to be considered while integrating
security into real-time CPS?
The challenges to answering these questions reside in the timing constraints imposed on real-time
CPS. I address these challenges by postulating the following hypothesis:
It is possible to integrate security into real-time cyber-physical systems
by a careful (task/scheduler-level) analysis of, and co-design with, system
constraints, viz. software, hardware and timing requirements.
My dissertation work shows that it becomes feasible to integrate security mechanisms in
real-time CPS without compromising timing/safety requirements by employing a combination
of time-aware solutions such as, (i) by imposing scheduling-level constraints (Chapters 4–5) or
(ii) interacting between scheduling/optimization techniques and hardware/software-based security
extensions (Chapter 6). The end goal, then, is to provide designers with a knob that they can use
to tune to one side or the other — real-time vs. security.
1The development of metrics for security is hard in general but can be made in specialized domains, as I
demonstrate.
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Application Specific － Protect Actuators
[SCATE]
• Real-time tasks execute natively
• Security checks perform inside a trusted enclave
• Both real-time and security monitoring 
tasks execute on a common platform
Figure 1.3: Various security integration techniques proposed in this dissertation. Chapters 4–5
present pure software-based solutions. CONTEGO (Chapter 4) is designed for single core systems
while HYDRA and HYDRA-C (Chapter 5) target multicore platforms. Chapter 6 (SCATE)
presents a hardware-supported architecture and compatible for both, single and multicore systems.
1.2 SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS
Based on the aforementioned challenges, my dissertation work is divided into three parts that
are presented in Chapters 4–6 (see Fig. 1.3). At the high-level, the solutions proposed in this
dissertation can be classified along two major dimensions. The horizontal dimension in Fig. 1.3
represents the type of the security integration techniques and the vertical dimension represents
the underlying real-time computational platform. The security integration techniques can be
either (i) pure software-based (Chapters 4–5) or (ii) leverage hardware-assisted security features
(Chapter 6). My proposed solutions are either (i) core-specific, i.e., designed for single core
(Chapter 4) or multicore (Chapter 5) systems or (ii) applicable for both, single and multicore
platforms (Chapter 6). I further consider cases where security monitoring tasks can be either
(i) periodic and independent of real-time applications (Chapters 4–5) or (ii) perform application-
specific checks, i.e., protect physical actuators from false actuation commands (Chapter 6). I now
summarize the solutions proposed in this dissertation.
Chapters 4–5 present scheduler-level defense mechanisms. These techniques (a) are software-
based approaches (integrated at design time), (b) can be applied by enforcing scheduler-level
constraints and (c) do not require any custom hardware and/or architectural support.
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In Chapter 4, I propose to incorporate security mechanisms into legacy single core RTS by
implementing them as separate, independent periodic tasks (called “security tasks”). While there
exists some work on reconciling the addition of security mechanisms into RTS [10, 11, 19, 20], they
tend to increase execution times for real-time tasks and thus negatively impact timing constraints.
Architectural frameworks such as those proposed in prior work [12–15, 18, 21, 22] assume the
availability of custom hardware-support for monitoring and hence not suitable for legacy systems.
In contrast, I focus on integrating monitoring and detection tasks without any perturbation to
the real-time scheduling order by using scheduler-level techniques. In order to provide the best
protection, the security tasks need to be executed quite often. The challenge then, is to determine
the “right periods” (i.e., minimum inter-execution time) for the security tasks. Therefore, I
introduce a technique that allows the execution of security tasks opportunistically with lowest-
priority (so that they do not interfere the execution order of real-time tasks), while keeping the
best possible periods for the security tasks. I then propose a dual-mode model (named CONTEGO)
that allows the security tasks to execute in two different modes: (a) by default security tasks execute
opportunistically when the system is deemed to be uncompromised; (b) if an anomaly is suspected,
the security tasks may switch to higher priority; (c) the system reverts to “normal” mode if: (i) no
anomalous activity is found or (ii) the root cause of the problem is detected and malicious entities
are removed. I also propose a metric (called tightness of monitoring) that provides us one way
to trade-off security with schedulability. I evaluate my propose technique using time-to-detect an
intrusion as a performance criteria with a view to observing how well the security tasks can perform
desired monitoring and detection after period selection.
The techniques proposed in Chapter 4 target single core systems. The use of multicore platforms
in real-time CPS is increasingly becoming common since they provide higher performance and
better energy efficiency [23]. However, this makes the problem of integrating security mechanisms
more complex. Unlike single core systems, integrating security into multicore platforms is more
challenging since the designers now have multiple choices for where to allocate the security tasks.
For instance, should the engineers: (i) spread the security tasks to all cores (in conjunction with
the real-time tasks) and if so, how to determine the task-to-core assignment? or (iii) execute them
continuously across any available core? In addition, how the designers can determine the periods
of the security tasks? Chapter 5 addresses aforementioned issues. In particular, I first develop a
low-complexity iterative solution (called HYDRA) that jointly finds the security tasks’ periods and
core assignments. The HYDRA mechanism assumes that the security tasks are statically assigned
across all available cores. I then extend HYDRA with an alternate design mechanism, HYDRA-C,
that can raise the “responsiveness” of monitoring tasks by increasing their frequency of execution.
The key intuition is that if the security tasks are able to execute with as few interruptions as
possible (e.g., by moving immediately to an empty core when they are interrupted), then there is
much higher chance of successful detection and correspondingly, a much lower chance of successful
adversarial action. HYDRA-C provides better monitoring when compared to HYDRA but comes
with a cost (in terms of context switch overhead).
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The techniques presented in Chapters 4–5 (i.e., CONTEGO, HYDRA, HYDRA-C) are pure
software-based (i.e., scheduler-level) solutions since real-time schedulers are considered to be the
most important resource management entity and hence is the focus of my work in terms of adding
security. I note that my software-based solutions execute both real-time and security tasks in a
common platform and hence the security mechanism may collapse if the adversary can compromise
the host operating system (OS). In the follow-up work (Chapter 6), I use hardware-assisted trusted
modules and execute security checks inside a tamper-resistant platform. Recall from Fig. 1.3 and
earlier discussion that, CONTEGO, HYDRA and HYDRA-C abstract application requirements
(i.e., security checks are periodic and independent of existing real-time tasks). Since majority
cyber-physical applications are largely based on sensing and actuation, any false/spoofed actuation
command — i.e., commands that control physical states — can disrupt the normal operation of the
plant. In Chapter 6, I leverage hardware-supported security extensions and address application-
specific requirements, i.e., protect physical actuators by checking actuation commands. I refer to
my framework SCATE. Specifically, SCATE uses the concept of trusted execution environments
(TEEs) [24] available in commodity processors (e.g., ARM TrustZone [25]) to ensure that security
critical execution segments of real-time tasks (e.g., checking of actuation commands) can not be
tampered even if the host OS is compromised. Unlike the frameworks proposed in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 that model detection/monitoring as independent and periodic tasks, security checks in
SCATE (i.e., validating actuation commands) are based on the actions of the real-time tasks (i.e.,
activated when real-time tasks generate actuation commands). I find out such TEE-based checking
of actuation commands in real-time applications can lead to significant context switch overhead
and a critical task may not comply with its timing requirements. To minimize checking overheads,
I therefore develop mechanisms (by using game theoretical analysis [26]) that selectively picks a
random subset of actuation commands for checking. I implement SCATE using off-the-shelf TEE
technology (ARM TrustZone) running embedded Linux. I demonstrate the feasibility of SCATE
for four real representative systems (viz., ground rover, flight controller, robotic arm and syringe
pump) and study the trade-off between security and timing guarantees.
Key Contributions of this Dissertation
• Design-time frameworks (CONTEGO, HYDRA, HYDRA-C) to integrate security tasks into
RTS that will allow system designers to improve the security posture without affecting
temporal constraints of the existing real-time tasks for both, single core (Chapter 4) and
multicore (Chapter 5) platforms.
• A new metric (named tightness of periodic monitoring) to measure the effectiveness of such
integration (Chapters 4–5).
• A time-aware hardware/software framework (SCATE) to secure COTS-based real-time cyber-
physical platforms against attacks that falsify actuation commands (Chapter 6). SCATE
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deters attacks with significantly less overheads and also guarantee that it will not violate
timing constraints.
Chapters 7–8 discuss the limitations and possible extensions of my proposed techniques. I now
start with related research (Chapter 2) and then present my assumptions on attacker’s capabilities
(Chapter 3).
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
In this chapter I summarize existing techniques. I have identified some well-defined categories and
sub-categories for related real-time scheduling and security research. I now present related work
along two fronts: (a) real-time scheduling models (Section 2.1) and (b) real-time CPS security
solutions (Section 2.2).
2.1 SCHEDULING AND PERIOD OPTIMIZATION IN RTS
While not in the context of real-time CPS security, there exist some related real-time scheduling
frameworks as I present below.
Real-Time Scheduling Frameworks
The system model presented in Chapters 4–5 may be viewed as special case of mixed-criticality
systems [27] where the system operates in multiple criticality levels (say “high” for real-time and
“low” for security tasks). However, unlike traditional mixed-criticality task model [28] where
execution times and periods are vectors of values (see the related survey [27]), I consider a single
execution time and period value (i.e., there exists only one criticality level). In mixed criticality
systems “low”-criticality tasks are abandoned to ensure timely operation of the “high”-criticality
tasks [29]. Abandoning security tasks may not be an option in my context since this will fail to
complete security checks in a timely manner. Mixed-criticality scheduling is also different than
the problem considered in this dissertation due to the fact that security properties (e.g., adaptive
switching depending on runtime behavior or frequent execution of monitoring events for faster
detection) are often different than temporal requirements (e.g., satisfying deadline constraints for
mixed-criticality tasks). However, the theory and concepts emerged from mixed-criticality systems
can also be applied to the real-time security problems to further harden the security posture of
future real-time CPS.
The scheduling approaches present in Chapter 5 can be considered as a special case of prior
work [30] where each task can bind to any arbitrary number of available cores. For a given period,
this prior analysis [30] is pessimistic for the model considered by HYDRA-C (i.e., real-time tasks are
partitioned and security tasks can migrate on any core) in a sense that it over-approximates carry-
in interference from the tasks bound to single cores (e.g., real-time tasks) and hence results in lower
schedulability (i.e., identical to the GLOBAL-TMax scheme in Fig. 5.7). Researchers also propose
various semi-partitioned scheduling strategies for fixed-priority RTS [31, 32]. However, these
existing work (a) primarily focus on improving schedulability (e.g., by allowing highest priority task
to migrate) and (b) are not designed for security requirements in consideration (e.g., minimizing
periods and executing security tasks with fewer interruption for faster anomaly detection).
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Period Selection in Real-Time/Control Systems
There exists other work [33, 34] in which the authors statically assign the periods for multiple
independent control tasks considering control delay as a cost metric. Davare et al. [35] propose
to assign task and message periods as well as satisfy end-to-end latency constraints for distributed
automotive systems by leveraging schedulability analysis within a convex optimization framework.
Previous work use a different model/application scenario (such as controller area networks [36]
and/or minimize control delay using utilization-bound tests) and hence can not be directly adapted
in my context.
2.2 SECURITY IN REAL-TIME CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Enhancing security in time-critical cyber-physical applications is an active research area (see the
related surveys [37, 38]). Security in real-time CPS has been addressed in literature in different
contexts — in broader sense this includes (but not limited to) integrating monitoring and intrusion
detection mechanisms, protecting communication channels, defending against side-channel attacks,
as well as designing hardware/software based architectural solutions.
Securing Communication Messages/Channels
Researchers proposed techniques to secure real-time CPS from man-in-the-middle attacks, where
an attacker can compromise communication between system sensors and controllers [39, 40]. The
goal is to find trade-offs between control performance and security overheads (e.g., overheads for
enforcing data integrity technique such as message authentication codes to prevent the attacks).
There has been some work [10, 11] where authors proposed to add security mechanisms (such as
encryption) into RTS and considered periodic task scheduling where each task requires a security
service whose overhead varies according to the quantifiable level of the service. Unlike my research,
all of the aforementioned work require modification of the existing real-time tasks.
Defense Against Side-Channel Attacks
Bao et al. [41] model the behavior of the attacker and introduce a scheduling algorithm. Unlike
hard RTS, authors consider a system with aperiodic tasks that have soft deadlines. The proposed
algorithm provides a trade-off between side-channel information leakage and the number of deadline
misses for the real-time tasks. In comparison, I propose to ensure security policies in hard RTS
without violating temporal constrains and schedulability of the real-time tasks. A state cleanup
mechanism is introduced in literature [42] where the authors modify the fixed priority scheduling
algorithm to mitigate information leakage through shared resources (e.g., caches). However, this
leakage prevention comes at a cost of reduced schedulability. In comparison, I propose to ensure
security policies without violating temporal constraints and schedulability of the real-time tasks.
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Randomization and Architectural Frameworks
Researchers also proposed schedule obfuscation methods [43] to minimize predictability of
deterministic RTS scheduler by randomizing the task schedule while providing the necessary real-
time guarantees. Unlike my schemes that works at the scheduler-level, there exist architectural
frameworks [12–15, 21, 22, 44] that can protect RTS against security vulnerabilities. I highlight
that all the aforementioned work require modification to the scheduler or real-time task parameters.
They are also not designed to protect against false actuation commands. It is not inconceivable
that those architectural frameworks and randomization protocols can the employed on top of my
proposed schemes to improve security posture in future real-time CPS.
Trusted Execution and CPS Security
Perhaps the closest line of work to SCATE is PROTC [45] where a monitor in the enclave
enforces secure access control policy (given by the control center) for some peripherals of the drone
and ensures that only authorized applications can access certain peripherals. Unlike my scheme,
PROTC is limited for specific applications (i.e., aerial robotic vehicles), requires a centralized
control center to validate/enforce security policies and does not consider real-time requirements.
Researchers also proposed anomaly detection approaches for robotic vehicles [17, 46, 47]. These
(prior) approaches do not leverage capabilities of TEEs (i.e., are vulnerable if the adversary
can compromise the host OS) and do not consider real-time aspects. Researchers also use
game-theoretical analysis for (a) general-purpose control systems [48, 49], (b) decision making
problems [50] and (c) preventing physical intrusions in CPS [51]. These schemes are not designed
to protect the systems against false actuation commands. In addition, they are not timing-aware
(i.e., real-time requirements are not considered). To the best of my knowledge, SCATE is the
first comprehensive work that introduces the notion of randomized coarse-grain checking using
game-theoretical model in order to validate actuation commands in a TEE-enabled real-time CPS.
There also exist large number of research for generic cyber-physical/Internet-of-things-specific
embedded systems as well as use of TrustZone to secure traditional embedded/mobile applications
(too many to enumerate here, refer to the related surveys [25, 52–55]) — however the consideration
of actuation-specific real-time security/scheduling distinguish SCATE from other research.
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CHAPTER 3: ASSUMPTIONS ON ADVERSARIAL CAPABILITIES
I now present my adversary model. I consider identical threat models in Chapters 4–5 (see
Section 3.1). Section 3.2 presents assumptions on attacker’s capabilities considered in Chapter 6.
3.1 ADVERSARY MODEL FOR CHAPTER 4 AND CHAPTER 5
In Chapters 4–5, I assume that an adversary may destabilize the system by leveraging
(known) vulnerabilities. For example, an attacker could compromise the file system (resulting
in corrupted information/system log), change the of control/actuation commands or infer side
channel information (e.g., user tasks, cache information, thermal profiles) to launch further attacks
(say denial of service). While there exists mechanisms (such as Simplex [56, 57]) that guarantee
(hardware/software) fault tolerance, I consider the cases where an attacker intentionally induces
faults (i.e., adversarial artifacts) that may jeopardize the safety of the system (e.g., results in miss
deadlines). My focus is on threats that can be dealt with by integrating additional security tasks
into the host. The addition of such tasks may necessitate changing the schedule or increasing the
execution time of real-time tasks as was the case in earlier work [10, 11, 19, 19, 42, 58, 59]. In this
research I consider situations where additional security tasks (see Table 4.1 for related examples)
are only allowed to have minimal (Chapter 4) or no impact (Chapter 5) on the schedule of existing
real-time tasks and are not allowed to modify real-time parameters. While I use specific intrusion
detection mechanisms (e.g., Tripwire [60], a filesystem integrity checking tool) to demonstrate my
approach, the ideas presented in Chapter 4–5 are agnostic to the specific monitoring mechanism.
The design of integration techniques and the design of the specific security tasks are orthogonal
problems. Since I aim to maximize the frequency of execution of security tasks, mechanisms whose
performance improves with frequency of execution (e.g., intrusion monitoring and detection tasks
or logging/tracing mechanisms) benefit from my model.
3.2 ADVERSARY MODEL FOR CHAPTER 6
My assumptions on adversarial capabilities in Chapter 6 is similar to that considered in prior
work [61, 62]. In particular, I assume that an adversary can tamper with the existing control logic to
manipulate actuation commands, thus modifying the behavior of a system in undesirable ways (i.e.,
threaten the safety of the system). I only consider the cases where an adversary’s actions results in
the modification of actuation commands. Other classes of attacks such as scheduler side-channel
attacks [63, 64], timing anomalies [61, 65] and network-level man-in-the-middle attacks [39, 40] are
not within the scope of this work. However, I do discuss how my approach can be extended to
other use-cases and mitigate some of those attacks (Chapter 7). I do not make any assumptions
as to how an adversary compromises tasks or actuation commands. For instance, bad software
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engineering practices leave vulnerabilities in the systems [66]. When the system is developed
using a multi-vendor model [20] (where various components are manufactured and integrated by
different vendors) malicious code may be injected (say by a less-trusted vendor) during deployment.
The adversary may also induce end-users to download modified source code and/or remote access
Trojans, say by using social engineering tactics [15]. I do not consider the adversarial cases that
require physical access, i.e., the attacker cannot physically control/turn off/damage the actuators
or the system.
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CHAPTER 4: AN ADAPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATING SECURITY
TASKS IN SINGLE CORE REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
I now assert one part of my dissertation hypothesis (Section 1.1) by presenting a scheduler-
level security integration framework. In particular, I focus on integrating security tasks into
RTS (especially legacy systems) and define a metric (named tightness of periodic monitoring) to
measure the effectiveness of such integration. I introduce the concept of “opportunistic execution”
with hierarchical scheduling [67] and then propose a framework, CONTEGO, that allows security
tasks to operate in two different modes. In CONTEGO, security monitoring tasks (a) execute
opportunistically with a lowest priority most of the time (i.e., during normal system operation);
(b) however can adaptively change their mode of operation and execute with a higher priority (for
a limited amount of time) if any anomalous behavior is suspected. I evaluate CONTEGO using
synthetic workloads as well as with an implementation on a realistic embedded platform (an open-
source ARM CPU running real-time Linux). CONTEGO is shown to increase the security posture
of RTS without impacting their temporal (and hence, safety) constraints.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Until recently, cyber-security considerations were an afterthought in the design of real-time CPS.
While fault-tolerance has been a design consideration, traditional fault-tolerance techniques that
were designed to counter and survive random or accidental faults are not sufficient to deal with
cyber-attacks. Given the increasing cyber-attack risks in RTS [3–7, 9], it is essential to integrate
resilience against such attacks into the design of RTS. There is also a need to retrofit existing critical
RTS with detection, survival and recovery mechanisms. The focus of my research is on integrating
or retrofitting security mechanisms into legacy RTS. A legacy RTS is one where modification or
perturbation of existing real-time tasks’ parameters (such as run-times, periods and task execution
orders) is not always feasible. When integrating any security mechanisms into RTS, the designers
need to ensure that they do not perturb or impact the real-time functions in any significant way
while at the same time provide the necessary level of security. Any security mechanisms that
are introduced not only have to co-exist with legacy real-time tasks without violating their real-
time and safety constraints but also the parameters of such legacy tasks cannot be adjusted to
accommodate the security tasks. This creates an apparent tension, especially so in the case of
legacy systems — between security requirements (e.g., having enough cycles for effective detection)
and the timing and safety requirements. Not only must the security mechanisms work effectively
but they must also not interfere with the deadlines of real-time tasks. For instance, any monitoring
and detection mechanism has to be designed so that an adversary cannot easily evade it. This
may require that the monitoring and detection tasks be run frequently. However, the stringent
timing constraints in hard RTS introduce additional complexities for the implementation of such
cyber-security mechanisms. For instance, the strict deadlines for the completion of periodic hard
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Table 4.1: Example of Security Tasks
Security Task Approach/Tools
File-system checking Tripwire [60], AIDE [68], etc.
Network packet monitoring Bro [69], Snort [70], etc.
Hardware event monitoring Statistical analysis based checks [71]
using performance monitors (e.g.,
perf [72], OProfile [73], etc.)
Application specific checking Behavior-based detection (see the related
work [13–15, 74])
RTS may not allow for frequent execution of security mechanisms. Further, unlike in conventional
computing systems, it may not be possible to execute the security mechanisms for arbitrary lengths
of time.
In this chapter I aim to improve the security posture of RTS through integration of “security
tasks” (i.e., tasks that are specific for intrusion monitoring and detection tasks purposes) into
an fixed-priority RTS while ensuring that the existing real-time tasks are not affected by such
integration. Security tasks could include protection, detection or response mechanisms, depending
on the system requirements — for instance, a sensor correlation task (to detect sensor manipulation)
or an anomaly detection task (that checks possible intrusions) [75]. Table 4.1 presents some
examples of security tasks that can be integrated into legacy systems (again, this is by no stretch
meant to be an exhaustive list). In my experiments I considered intrusion detection as a monitoring
mechanism and used Tripwire [60] (a data integrity checking tool) to demonstrate the feasibility
of my approach — the ideas presented in this dissertation though apply more broadly to other
security mechanisms.
Considerations for Integrating Security Mechanisms. While integrating security tasks
into RTS, the following performance criteria need to be considered.
i) Monitoring Frequency: In order to provide the best protection, the security tasks need to
be executed quite often. On the one hand, if the interval between consecutive monitoring
events is too large, the adversary may harm the system (and remain undetected) between
two invocations of the security task. On the other hand, if the security tasks are executed
very frequently then it may impact the schedulability of the real-time tasks. Herein lies an
important trade-off between monitoring frequency and schedulability.
ii) Responsiveness: In some circumstances, a security task may need to execute with less
interference from higher-priority tasks. For instance, consider the scenario where a security
breach is suspected. In such an event the security task may be required to perform more
fine-grained checking instead of waiting for its next periodic slot. This may result in delayed
execution of low-priority, non-critical, real-time tasks. However, the scheduling policy needs
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to ensure that the system remains secure without violating real-time constraints for critical,
high-priority, real-time tasks.
In this work I first focus on the monitoring frequency criterion (Section 4.4.1) and then extend
to improve responsiveness properties (Section 4.6). In particular, I consider incorporating security
mechanisms by implementing them as separate periodic tasks. This brings up the challenge of
determining the “right periods” (i.e., minimum inter-monitoring time) for the security tasks [76].
For example, consider the integration of an intrusion detection system (IDS) in an existing RTS
(for instance Tripwire or AIDE from Table 4.1) that checks integrity of filesystems. For functional
correctness the IDS task needs to execute at least once within a certain time period. If such a task
is scheduled less frequently or interrupted often before it can complete checking the entire system
(say by other, higher priority, real-time tasks), then an adversary could use that opportunity to
intrude into the system and modify sensitive file contents before the next invocation of the detection
task. In contrast, if the IDS task is executed more frequently, it may interfere the operation of
other low priority tasks. My analysis engine takes the real-time task parameters and periodicity
requirements of the security tasks and then find the suitable periods for the security tasks without
violating timing requirements (refer to Sections 4.5–4.5.2 for a formal model). This is different than
criticality-monotonic priority scheduling [77] in mixed-criticality systems [28] where task period and
priority ordering are already defined.
In some circumstances a security task may need to complete with less interference (e.g., better
responsiveness) from higher-priority real-time tasks. As an example, consider the scenario in which
a security breach is suspected and a security task may be required to perform more fine-grained
checking instead of waiting for its next execution slot. At the same time, the scheduling policy
needs to ensure that the system does not violate real-time constraints for critical, high-priority
control tasks. A simple approach to integrate security tasks without perturbing real-time scheduling
order is to execute them opportunistically, that is, with the lowest priority so that real-time tasks
are not affected. However, if the security tasks always execute with lowest priority, they suffer
more interference (i.e., preemption from high-priority real-time tasks) and the consequent longer
detection time (due to poor response time) will make the security mechanisms less effective. In
order to provide better responsiveness and increase the effectiveness of monitoring and detection
mechanisms, I then propose a multi-mode framework called CONTEGO.1 For the most part,
CONTEGO executes in a PASSIVE mode (i.e., with opportunistic execution of intrusion detection
tasks). However, CONTEGO will switch to an ACTIVE mode of operation to perform additional
checks as needed (e.g., fine-grained analysis, used as an example in Section 4.7.2). This ACTIVE
mode potentially executes with higher priority, while ensuring the timing guarantees of real-time
tasks.
Contributions. In this chapter I have the following contributions:
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Figure 4.1: CONTEGO: flow of operations depicting the PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes for the
security tasks.
• I introduce CONTEGO, an extensible framework to integrate security tasks into legacy RTS
(Section 4.2).
• CONTEGO allows the security tasks to execute with minimal perturbation of the scheduling
order of the real-time tasks while guaranteeing their timing constraints (Sections 4.5–4.6).
The proposed method can adapt to changes due to malicious activities by switching its mode
of operation.
• I propose a metric (named “tightness of monitoring”) to measure the security posture of the
system in terms of frequency of execution (Section 4.4).
I also evaluate the schedulability and security of the proposed approach using a range of synthetic
task sets and a prototype implementation on an ARM-based development board with real-time
Linux (Section 4.7). I now start with a brief overview of CONTEGO.
4.2 OVERVIEW OF CONTEGO
As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, CONTEGO improves the security posture of the system (that contains
a set of real-time tasks) by integrating additional security tasks and allowing them to execute in
two different modes (viz., PASSIVE and ACTIVE). I highlight that rather than designing specific
intrusion detection tasks that target specific attack behaviors, the generic framework proposed in
this chapter allows one to integrate a given security mechanism (referred to as security tasks) into
the system without perturbing the system parameters (e.g., period and task execution execution
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order). If the system is deemed to be clean (i.e., not compromised), security tasks can execute
opportunistically2 (e.g., when other real-time tasks are not running). However if any anomaly or
unusual behavior is suspected, the security policy may switch to ACTIVE mode (e.g., more fine-
grained checking or response) and execute with higher priority for a limited amount of time (since
our goal is to ensure security with minimum perturbation of the scheduling order of the real-time
tasks). The security tasks may go back to normal (e.g., PASSIVE) mode if:
• No anomalous activity is found within a predefined time duration, say TAC ; or
• The intrusion is detected and malicious entities are removed (or an alarm triggered if human
intervention is required).
Although I allow the security tasks to execute with higher priority than some of the real-time tasks
in ACTIVE mode, the proposed framework ensures that the timeliness constraints (e.g., deadlines)
for all of the real-time tasks are always satisfied in both modes. By using this strategy, CONTEGO
not only enables compatibility with legacy systems (i.e., in normal situation real-time scheduling
order is not perturbed), but also provides flexibility to promptly deal with anomalous behaviors (i.e.,
the security tasks are promoted to higher priority so that they can experience less preemption and
achieve better response times).
4.3 SYSTEM MODEL
4.3.1 Real-Time Tasks
In this paper I consider the widely used fixed-priority sporadic task model [78]. In particular,
I consider a uniprocessor system consisting of m fixed-priority sporadic real-time tasks ΓR =
{τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}. Each real-time task τj ∈ ΓR is characterized by (Cj , Tj , Dj), where Cj is the
wors-case execution time (WCET) [79], Tj is the minimum inter-arrival time (or period) between
successive releases and Dj is the relative deadline. We assume that priorities are distinct and
assigned according to the rate monotonic (RM) [80] order (i.e., short task period implies higher
priority).
The processor utilization of τj is defined as Uj =
Cj
Tj
. Let hpR(τj) and lpR(τj) denote the sets
of real-time tasks that have higher and lower priority than τj , respectively. We assume that the
real-time task-set ΓR is schedulable by a fixed-priority preemptive scheduling algorithm. Therefore,
the worst-case response time wi is less than or equal to the deadline Di and the following inequality
is satisfied for all tasks τj ∈ ΓR: wj ≤ Dj , where wj = wk+1j = wkj is obtained by the following
recurrence relation [81]:
w0j = Cj , w
k+1
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I model PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode security tasks as independent periodic tasks. The PASSIVE
and ACTIVE mode tasks are denoted by the sets ΓpaS = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τnp} and ΓacS = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τna},
respectively. I assume that security tasks in both modes follow RM priority order. Each security
task τi ∈ {ΓpaS ∪ΓacS } is characterized by the tuple (Ci, T desi , Tmaxi , ωi), where Ci is the WCET, T desi
is the most desired period between successive releases (i.e., F desi =
1
T desi
is the desired execution
frequency of a security routine) and Tmaxi is the maximum allowable period beyond which security
checking by τi may not be effective. The parameter ωi > 0 is a designer-provided weighting factor
that may reflect the criticality of the security task3 τi. Critical security tasks would have larger
ωi. The security tasks have implicit deadlines, i.e., Di = Ti,∀τi that implies security tasks should
complete before their next monitoring instance. I do not make any specific assumptions about the
security tasks in different modes. For instance, both PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode task-sets may
contain completely different sets of tasks (i.e., {ΓpaS ∩ΓacS } = ∅) or may contain (partially) identical
tasks with different parameters (i.e., period and/or criticality requirements).
In PASSIVE mode, security tasks are executed with lower priority than the real-time tasks. Hence
the security tasks do not have any impact on real-time tasks and cannot perturb the real-time
scheduling order. In ACTIVE mode, I allow the security tasks to execute with a priority higher
than that of certain low priority real-time tasks. This provides us with a trade-off mechanism
between security (e.g., responsiveness) and system constraints (e.g., scheduling order of real-time
tasks). Since the task priorities are distinct, there are m priority-levels for real-time tasks (indexed
from 0 to m − 1 where level 0 is the highest priority). Among the m priority-levels, we assume
that ACTIVE mode security tasks can execute with a priority-level up to lS (0 < lS ≤ m), lS ∈ Z.
Although any period Ti within the range T
des
i ≤ Ti ≤ Tmaxi is acceptable for PASSIVE (e.g.,
τi ∈ ΓpaS ) and ACTIVE (e.g., τi ∈ ΓacS ) mode security tasks, the actual period Ti is not known
a priori. Furthermore, for ACTIVE mode security tasks (e.g., τi ∈ ΓacS ), we need to find out the
suitable priority level l ∈ [lS ,m]. Therefore our goal is to find the suitable period (for both PASSIVE
and ACTIVE mode security tasks) as well as the priority-level (for ACTIVE mode security tasks)
that achieve the best trade-off between schedulability and defense against security breaches without
violating the real-time constraints.
3As an example, the default configuration of Tripwire [60], an intrusion detection system (IDS) for Linux that I
use as case study in Section 4.7.2, has different criticality levels (viz., weights), e.g., High (for scanning files that are
significant points of vulnerability), Medium (for non-critical files that are of significant security impact) and so forth.
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4.4 PERIOD ADAPTATION
As already mentioned, one fundamental problem in integrating security tasks is to determine
which security tasks will be running when. This is different when compared to scheduling traditional
real-time tasks since the real-time task parameters (e.g., periods) are often derived from physical
system properties and cannot be adjusted due to control/application requirements. One may
wonder why I cannot assign the desired period (e.g., Ti = T
des
i ) in both PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes
and set the ACTIVE mode priority level as l = lS so that the security tasks can always execute with
the desired frequency (i.e., F desi =
1
T desi
) and experience less interference (e.g., preemption) from
real-time tasks. However, since my goal is to integrate security mechanisms in legacy systems with
minimal4 or no perturbation, setting Ti = T
des
i , ∀τi in either or both mode(s) may significantly
perturb the real-time scheduling order. If the schedulability of the system is not analyzed after the
perturbation, some (or all) of the real-time tasks may miss their deadlines and thus the main safety
requirements of the system will be threatened. The same argument is also true for ACTIVE mode
if I set l = lS (or arbitrarily from the range [lS ,m]) and do not perform schedulability analysis
carefully.
Tightness of the Monitoring
Recall that the actual period as well as the priority-levels of the security tasks are unknown and
we need to adapt the periods within acceptable ranges. I measure the security of the system by
means of achievable periodic monitoring. Let Ti be the period of the security task τi ∈ {ΓpaS ∪ΓacS }
that needs to be determined. My goal is to minimize the gap between the achievable period Ti and













ωiηi denote the cumulative tightness of the achievable periodic
monitoring for PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode, respectively. This monitoring frequency metric,
provides for instance, one way to trade-off security with schedulability. Recall that if the interval
between consecutive monitoring events is too large, the adversary may remain undetected and
harm the system between two invocations of the security task. Again, a very frequent execution
of security tasks may impact the schedulability of the real-time tasks. This metric η(·) will allow
us to execute the security routines with a frequency closer to the desired one while respecting the
temporal constraints of the other real-time tasks.
4In ACTIVE mode CONTEGO does not introduce any timing violations for the real-time tasks, but their execution
might be delayed due to interference from high-priority security tasks (i.e., the tasks with priority-level l ∈ [lS ,m]).
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4.4.1 Problem Overview
One may wonder why we cannot schedule the security tasks in the same way that the existing
real-time tasks are scheduled. For instance, a simple approach to integrating security tasks in
PASSIVE mode without perturbing real-time scheduling order is to execute security tasks at a
lower priority than all real-time tasks. Hence, the security routines will be executing only during
slack times when no other higher-priority real-time tasks are running. Likewise, in ACTIVE mode,
security tasks can be executed at a lower priority than more critical, high-priority real-time tasks.
Hence, the security tasks will only be executing when other real-time tasks with priority-levels
higher than lS are not running.
When both real-time and security tasks follow RM priority order, we can formulate a nonlinear
optimization problem for PASSIVE mode with the following constraints that maximizes the




















Tj ∀τi ∈ ΓpaS (4.5)
T desi ≤ Ti ≤ Tmaxi ∀τi ∈ Γ
pa
S (4.6)
where Tpa = [T1, T2, · · · , Tnp ]T is the optimization variable for PASSIVE mode that needs to be
determined. The constraint in Eq. (4.4) ensures that the utilization of the security tasks are within
the remaining RM utilization bound [80]. The RM priority order for real-time and security tasks
is ensured by the constraints in Eq. (4.5), while Eq. (4.6) ensures the restrictions on periodic
monitoring.
Recall that in ACTIVE mode, I allow the security tasks to execute when the real-time tasks with
priority-levels higher than lS are not running. Hence, to ensure the RM priority order in ACTIVE
mode, we need to modify the constraints in Eq. (4.5) as follows:
Ti ≥ max
τj∈ΓRhp(lS)
Tj , ∀τi ∈ ΓacS (4.7)
where ΓRhp(lS) represents the set of real-time tasks that are higher priority than level lS . In addition,
the constraints in Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.6) also need to be updated to consider ACTIVE mode task-
sets (e.g., ΓacS ) and the number of active mode security tasks (na). Thus for ACTIVE mode we can
formulate an optimization problem similar to that of P4.1 with the objective function: max
Tac
ηac,
where Tac = [T1, T2, · · · , Tna ]T is the ACTIVE mode optimization variable.
Although it is non-trivial to solve the above non-linear non-convex optimization problem in its
current form, it is possible to transform the above formulations into a convex optimization problem
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using an approach similar to that presented in this chapter. However, one of the limitations of the
above approach is that the overall system utilization is limited by the RM bound which has the




n − 1) = ln 2 ≈ 69.31% [80],
where n is the total number of tasks under consideration. Further, the security tasks’ periods need
to satisfy the constraints in Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (4.7) (for PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes, respectively)
to follow RM priority order. In addition, instead of focusing only on optimizing the periods of the
security tasks, CONTEGO aims to provide an adaptive framework that can achieve other security
aspects (viz., responsiveness). Hence, instead of simply running security tasks by themselves in
idle-times or within predefined priority ranges, I propose using a “server” [67] to execute the
security tasks. With this approach, for instance, if better responsiveness is desired from security
mechanisms, we could increase the priority of the server and allow the server to execute until
the security task finishes its desired checking. Not only will the server abstraction allow me to
provide better isolation between real-time and security tasks; but it also enables me to integrate
responsiveness properties as I discuss in the following.
4.5 THE SECURITY SERVER
The server [67] is an abstraction that provides execution time to the security tasks according to
a predefined scheduling algorithm. My proposed security server is characterized by the capacity Q
and replenishment period P and works as follows. The server is executed with lowest-priority in
PASSIVE mode. However, in ACTIVE mode, the server can switch to any allowable priority-level5
within the range [lS ,m]. If any security task is activated at time t, then the server is activated
with capacity Q and the next replenishment time is set as t + P . When the server is scheduled,
it executes the security tasks according to its own scheduling policy. In this work I assume that
the server schedules the security tasks using fixed-priority RM scheduling. When a security task
executes, the current available capacity is decremented accordingly. The server can be preempted
by the scheduler to service real-time tasks. When the server is preempted, the currently available
capacity is not decremented. If the available capacity becomes zero and some security task has
not yet finished, then the server is suspended until its next replenishment time (t′). At time t′,
the server is recharged to its full capacity Q, the next replenishment time is set as t′ + P , and the
server is executed again. When the last security task has finished executing and there is no other
pending task in the server, the server will be suspended. Also, the server will become inactive if
there are no security tasks ready to execute.
4.5.1 Reformulation of the Period Adaptation Problem using Servers
When security tasks execute within the server, we need to modify the constraints in the period
adaption problem considering the server parameters Q and P . In the following I briefly discuss
5Calculation of the server priority-level is described in Section 4.6.
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how to customize the period adaptation problem with the inclusion of the server.
Let me use UBS(Q,P ),Γ to denote the utilization bound for the set of tasks Γ executing within
the server. When the smallest period of the task is greater than or equal to 3P − 2Q, it has
been shown [82] that the upper bound of the utilization factor for the security tasks is given by






, where n is number of tasks in the set Γ.
Thus with the inclusion of the server in PASSIVE mode, I now modify the constraints in Eqs.














Ti ≥ 3P pa − 2Qpa, ∀τi ∈ ΓpaS . (4.9)
Therefore, selection of the periods for security tasks in PASSIVE mode is a nonlinear constrained










Subject to: Eqs. (4.8), (4.9), (4.6).
where Qpa and P pa are the server capacity and replenishment period in PASSIVE mode, respectively.
























Ti ≥ 3P ac − 2Qac ∀τi ∈ ΓacS (4.13)
T desi ≤ Ti ≤ Tmaxi ∀τi ∈ ΓacS (4.14)
where Qac and P ac are the server capacity and replenishment period in ACTIVE mode, respectively.
4.5.2 Selection of the Server Parameters
The period adaptation problem illustrated in Section 4.5.1 is derived based on a given set of
server parameters, e.g., (Q(·), P (·)). However, a fundamental problem is to find a suitable pair of
server capacity Q(·) and replenishment period P (·) that respects the real-time constraints of the
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tasks in the system. My approach to selecting the server parameters in PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode
is described below.
Parameter Selection in Passive Mode
Recall that in PASSIVE mode, the server will execute with the lowest priority to have
compatibility with existing real-time tasks. Since the security tasks execute within the server,
we need to ensure the following two constraints:
• The server is schedulable: that is the server’s capacity and interference from higher priority
real-time tasks are less than the replenishment period; and
• The security tasks are schedulable: the minimum supply by the server to the security tasks
is greater than the worst-case workload generated by the security tasks.
Note that since the server is running with lowest priority, the real-time constraints (e.g.,
wj ≤ Dj , ∀τj ∈ ΓR) and the task execution order are not affected in the PASSIVE mode. Based
on the above two constraints, I illustrate an approach for determining the server parameters by
formulating it as a constraint optimization problem.
The security server is referred to as schedulable if the worst-case response time of the server does
not exceed its replenishment period [67]. Thus, following an approach similar to ones in earlier
work [83, 84], the server schedulability constraint can be represented as follows:









Ch is the worst-case interference experienced by the server
when preempted by the higher priority real-time tasks. In the above equation, the set of real-time
tasks with higher priority than the server (i.e., hpR(τ
pa
S ) = ΓR) is fixed.
Let me use hppaS (τi) to denote the set of PASSIVE mode security tasks that are higher priority than
τi ∈ ΓpaS . To ensure schedulability of the security tasks, we can derive the minimum supply of the
server delivered to the security tasks by using the periodic resource model from the literature [83–
85]. In particular, the constraints on the server supply to ensure schedulability of the security tasks
can be expressed as (refer to Appendix A.1 for formal derivations):
Qpa
P pa
[Ti − (P pa −Qpa)−∆Spa ] ≥ Ipai , ∀τi ∈ Γ
pa
S (4.16)







Ch is the worst-case workload generated by the security task τi
and hppaS (τi) during the time interval of Ti. This workload is a constant for a given input.
Since I need to ensure maximal processor utilization for the security tasks without violating the
real-time constraints of the system, I define the following objective function: max
Qpa,P pa
Qpa
P pa . With this
24
objective function and the constraints in Eqs. (4.15)–(4.16), the PASSIVE mode server parameter







Subject to: Eqs. (4.15), (4.16)
where server parameters Qpa and P pa are the optimization variables.
Parameter Selection in Active Mode
In ACTIVE mode, the security server is no longer the lowest priority task. Since the server can
execute with priority lS , there could be up to m− lS low priority real-time tasks than that of the
server. Thus we need to ensure the schedulability of the real-time tasks that are executing with a
priority lower than the server. Hence, in addition to the constraints described in Section 4.5.2 (i.e.,
Eqs. (4.15)–(4.16)), we need to consider the following:
• The real-time tasks with lower priority than the server are schedulable: that is, the
interferences from the server and other higher priority real-time tasks do not violate the
deadlines for these low-priority tasks.



























Qac is the worst-case interference caused to τj by the server in ACTIVE mode. As
illustrated in Section 4.6, I iterate through the allowable priority ranges (e.g., [lS ,m]) to find the
server priority in ACTIVE mode. Note that for a given priority-level, the set of tasks lp(τacS ) is
predefined. Thus the only variables for the constraints in Eq. (4.18) are the server capacity Qac
and replenishment period P ac.
Let me use hpacS (τi) to denote the set of ACTIVE mode security tasks that are higher priority


















Ch ≤ P ac (4.20)
Qac
P ac
[Ti − (P ac −Qac)−∆Sac ] ≥ Iaci ∀τi ∈ ΓacS (4.21)
where the set of real-time tasks with higher priority than the server (i.e., hpR(τ
ac
S ) ⊂ ΓR) is a







Ch is the worst-case workload
generated by the security task τi and hp
ac
S (τi). Note that the schedulability of the higher priority
real-time tasks (i.e., ∀τj ∈ hpR(τacS )) is already ensured by definition.
Remark 4.1. The formulation of the period adaptation and server parameter selection problems
are nonlinear constraint optimization problems and are nontrivial to solve in their current form.
However, these problems can be transformed into a geometric programming (GP) [86] problem. In
addition, it is also possible to reformulate the non-convex GP representation into equivalent convex
form that can be solved using known algorithms such as the interior point [87, Ch. 11] method. For
details of this reformulation, I refer the readers to Appendix A.2.
4.5.3 Discussion on Mode Switching
As mentioned earlier, by default, CONTEGO operates in PASSIVE mode (i.e., execute
opportunistically). However, when a malicious activity is suspected, a PASSIVE-to-ACTIVE mode
change request will be issued. Similarly, an ACTIVE-to-PASSIVE mode change request will be
placed if the system seems clean after fine-grained checking, or a malicious entity is found and
removed. In steady-state (e.g., when security tasks are executing in PASSIVE or ACTIVE mode), the
schedulability of the real-time tasks is already guaranteed by the analysis presented in Section 4.5.2.
When CONTEGO switches from PASSIVE mode to ACTIVE mode, the schedulability of real-time
tasks will not be affected. The reason this that all the real-time tasks are higher priority than the
security tasks in PASSIVE mode and hence do not suffer any additional interference from security
tasks during mode change. Therefore, the schedulability of real-time tasks during PASSIVE-to-
ACTIVE mode switching is already covered by steady-state analysis (Section 4.5.2).
During ACTIVE-to-PASSIVE mode switching, observe that schedulability of the real-time tasks
that have a priority higher than the server (i.e., hpR(τ
ac
S )) is not affected. When the mode switch
request is issued, the ACTIVE mode server (and the security tasks) stop execution and the control is
then switched to the lowest priority PASSIVE mode server. Note that the constraints in Eq. (4.18)
that ensures the schedulability of the low-priority real-time tasks already captures the worst-case
interference introduced by the server. Hence the server will not impose any more interference
(even if the mode switch is performed in the middle of the execution of a busy interval) on the
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low-priority real-time tasks than what I have calculated in the steady-state analysis (Section 4.5.2).
Therefore if both the PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes task-sets are schedulable, the system will also
be schedulable with mode changes.
4.6 ALGORITHM
I develop a simple scheme to obtain the security task’s period (for both PASSIVE and ACTIVE
mode) and priority-level (for ACTIVE mode). The overall algorithm, Algorithm 4.1, works as
follows.
To find the PASSIVE mode parameters, I initialize the security task’s period with the desired
period and solve the server parameter selection problem P4.4 (Lines 10–11). If there exists a
solution (e.g., the constraints are satisfied), I then obtain the periods of the security tasks by
solving P4.2 (Line 13). In the event that neither of these optimization problems returns a solution,
I report the task-set as unschedulable (Line 20), since it is not possible to execute security tasks
opportunistically without violating real-time constraints.
To select ACTIVE mode parameters, the algorithm iterates through each of the acceptable
priority-levels [lS ,m] and tries to obtain the periods that maximize tightness for periodic monitoring
without violating the real-time constraints (Lines 26–36). If there exists a solution (e.g., constraints
in P4.5 and P4.3 are mutually consistent), I store the solution in a candidate list. The algorithm
then finds the best priority-level from the candidate solution sets that provides the maximum
tightness (Line 39). In the event that no candidate solutions are found for any of the allowable
priority ranges, the algorithm reports the task-set as unschedulable.
If both the PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode tasks are schedulable, then Algorithm 4.1 returns the
corresponding periods and the ACTIVE mode priority-level (Line 4). Otherwise, the system is
considered as unschedulable (Line 7) since it is not possible to integrate security tasks with desired
requirements. This unschedulability result hints that the designers of the system should update
system parameters (e.g., the number of security tasks, desired and maximum allowable periods
of the security tasks, periods of the real-time tasks, if permissible) in order to integrate security
mechanisms.
4.7 EVALUATION
I evaluate CONTEGO with randomly generated synthetic workloads (Section 4.7.1) as well as
a proof-of-concept implementation on an ARM-based embedded development board and real-time
Linux (Section 4.7.2). My implementation is available in a public repository [88].
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Algorithm 4.1: Feasibility Checking and Parameter Selection




S , allowable priority ranges [lS ,m]
Output: The tuple {l∗,Tpa, Qpa, P pa,Tac, Qac, Pac}, e.g., ACTIVE mode server priority-level, ACTIVE and PASSIVE mode
periods of the security tasks and ACTIVE and PASSIVE mode server parameters if the task-set is schedulable; Unschedulable
otherwise






2: if Solution Found in BOTH Modes then
3: return {l∗,Tpa, Qpa, P pa,Tac, Qac, Pac} /* return the parameters */
4: else
5: return Unschedulable /* not possible to integrate security tasks in the system */
6: end if
7: function PassiveModeParamSelection(ΓR, Γ
pa
S )
8: Initialize PASSIVE mode period Ti := T desi , ∀τi ∈ Γ
pa
S
9: Solve P4.4 to obtain server parameters
10: if SolutionFound then
11: Solve P4.2 to obtain security periods
12: if SolutionFound then
13: /* return the parameters */
14: return Tpa, Qpa, P pa where Qpa, P pa and Tpa are the solutions obtained by P4.4 and P4.2
15: end if
16: else
17: return Unschedulable /* unable to integrate PASSIVE mode security tasks */
18: end if
19: end function
20: function ActiveModeParamSelection(ΓR, ΓacS , lS)
21: Schedulable := false





23: for each priority level l′ ∈ [lS ,m] do
24: Solve P4.5 to obtain server parameters
25: if SolutionFound then
26: Solve P4.3 to obtain security periods
27: if SolutionFound then
28: /* store the parameters for priority level l′ where Q∗, P ∗ and T∗ are the solutions obtained by P4.5 and
P4.3 */
29: Q(l′) := Q∗, P (l′) := P ∗,T(l′) := T∗




34: /* obtain the parameters that provide best metric */
35: if Schedulable then
36: Find the priority-level l∗ from the solution vector T(l′)∀l′∈[lS ,m]| tasks at l′ is schedulable




37: Set Tac := T(l∗), Qac := Q(l∗), Pac := P (l∗)
38: /* return the parameters */
39: return l∗, Tac, Qac, Pac
40: else
41: return Unschedulable /* unable to integrate ACTIVE mode security tasks */
42: end if
43: end function
4.7.1 Experiment with Synthetic Task-sets
Simulation Setup
In order to generate task-sets with an even distribution of tasks, I grouped the real-time and
security task-sets by base-utilization from [0.01 + 0.1 · i, 0.1 + 0.1 · i], where i ∈ Z∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ 9. Each
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Figure 4.2: PASSIVE mode vs. ACTIVE mode: difference in cumulative tightness of achievable
periodic monitoring, ηav − ηpa. Non-zero difference indicates that the ACTIVE mode tasks achieve
better tightness than PASSIVE mode tasks. Task-sets from different base-utilization groups are
represented by different colors. Each of the data points represents schedulable task-sets.
utilization group contained 500 task-sets. In other words, a total of 5000 task-sets were tested for
each of the experiments. The utilization of the real-time and security tasks were generated by the
UUniFast [89] algorithm and I used GGPLAB [90] to solve the optimization problems.
I used the parameters similar to those used in earlier research [19, 83]. In particular, each task-set
instance contained [3, 10] real-time and [2, 5] security tasks in each of the modes. Each real-time
task τj ∈ ΓR had a period Tj ∈ [10 ms, 100 ms] and we assumed lS = d0.4me. The desired periods
for the security tasks ∀τi ∈ {ΓpaS ∪ ΓacS } were selected from [1000 ms, 3000 ms] and the maximum
allowable period was assumed to be Tmaxi = 10T
des
i . I considered ωi = 1, ∀τi ∈ {Γ
pa
S ∪ΓacS } and the
total utilization of the security tasks was assumed to be no more than 30% of the real-time tasks.
Results
Impact on Cumulative Tightness. In Fig. 4.2 we can see the difference in the tightnesses
of the periodic monitoring obtained by PASSIVE and ACTIVE mode (i.e., ηac − ηpa). For fair
comparison we used the same task-sets for both modes. The x-axis of Fig. 4.2 represents the total
system utilization (e.g., utilization of both real-time and security tasks). The positive values in
the y-axis of Fig. 4.2 imply that the ACTIVE mode tasks obtain better tightness that the PASSIVE
mode tasks.
The figure shows that ACTIVE mode tasks can achieve better cumulative tightness, and that the
cumulative tightness ηpa is comparatively better in low to medium utilization. The main reason is
that in ACTIVE mode security tasks are allowed to execute with higher priority, that causes less
interference and eventually increases the feasible region in the optimization problems (and hence
provides better tightness). For higher utilizations the difference is close to zero. This is because, as
utilization increases there is less slack in the system, making it difficult to schedule security tasks
frequently and resulting in similar levels of tightness for both modes.
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Figure 4.3: The effectiveness of security vs. total utilization of the system. The closer the y-axis
values to 1, the nearer each security task’s period is to the desired period.


























Figure 4.4: Schedulability of real-time and security tasks in both modes. The acceptance ratio is
defined by the ratio of the number of accepted task sets over the total number of generated tasks.
For each of the data points, 500 individual task-sets were tested.
Effectiveness of Security. The parameter η(·) is given by the total number of security tasks
and provides insights on cumulative measures of security. However, in this experiment (refer to
Fig. 4.3) I wanted to measure the effectiveness of the security of the system by observing whether
each of the security tasks in any mode can achieve an execution frequency closer to the desired
one. Hence I used the following metric: ξ = 1 − ‖T
∗−Tdes‖2
‖Tmax−Tdes‖2
where T∗ is the solution obtained
from Algorithm 4.1, Tdes = [T desi ]
T
∀τi and T
max = [Tmaxi ]
T
∀τi are the desired and maximum period
vector (refer to Section 4.7.1), respectively, and ‖·‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm. The closer the
value of ξ to 1, the nearer each of the security task’s period is to the desired period.
As the total utilization increases, the feasible set of the period adaptation problem that respects
all constraints in the optimization problems becomes more restrictive. As a result, we see the
degradation in effectiveness (in terms of ξ) for the task-sets with higher utilization. However, from
my experiments I find that CONTEGO can achieve periods that are within 18% of the desired
periods.
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Impact on the Schedulability. I used the acceptance ratio metric to evaluate schedulability.
The acceptance ratio (y-axis in Fig. 4.4) is defined as the number of accepted task-sets (e.g., the
task-sets that satisfied all the constraints) over the total number of generated ones. As depicted in
Fig. 4.4 the ACTIVE mode task-set achieves better schedulability compared to the PASSIVE ones.
Recall that ACTIVE mode task-sets can be promoted up to priority level lS . As a result ACTIVE
mode security tasks potentially experience less interference than the PASSIVE ones. This flexibility
gives the optimization routines a larger feasibility region to satisfy all the constraints.
4.7.2 Experiment with Security Applications in an Embedded Platform
To observe the performance of the proposed scheme in a practical setup, I implemented
CONTEGO on an embedded platform. My experimental platform [91] was configured with 1 GHz
ARM Cortex-A8 single-core processor and 512 MB RAM. I used Linux as the operating system –
that allowed me to utilize the existing Linux-based IDSes (refer to Table 4.3) for the evaluation.
Since the vanilla Linux kernel is unsuitable for hard real-time scheduling, I enabled the real-time
capabilities with the Xenomai [92] 2.6.3 real-time patch (kernel version 3.8.13-r72) on top of an
embedded Debian Linux console image.
I measured the WCET of the real-time and security tasks using ARM cycle counter registers
(e.g., CCNT), giving us nanosecond-level precision. Since these registers are not enabled by
default, I developed a Linux kernel module to access the registers from application codes. My
prototype implementation was developed in C and uses a fixed-priority scheduler powered by the
Xenomai real-time patch. Real-time and security tasks in the system were defined by Xenomai
rt task create() function and were suspended after the completion of corresponding instances
using the rt task wait period() function.
Real-time Tasks. For a real-time application, I considered a UAV control system (refer to Table
4.2). I implemented it using an open-source UAV model [93]. The original application codes were
based on the STM32F4 micro-controller (ARM Cortex M4) and developed for FreeRTOS [94].
Because of differences in library support and execution semantics, I updated the source codes
accordingly and ported them to Linux.
Security Tasks. To integrate security in the aforesaid control system, I included additional
security tasks. For the security tasks, I considered two lightweight open-source intrusion detection
mechanisms, (i) Tripwire [60], that detects integrity violations by storing clean system state during
initialization and using it later to detect intrusions by comparing the current system state against
the stored clean values, and (ii) Bro [69] that monitors anomalies in network traffic. As Table 4.3
shows, I consider several security tasks in both modes, e.g., protecting security task’s own binary
files, protecting system binary and library files, monitoring network traffic. In each mode, I set the
desired and maximum allowable periods of the security tasks such that utilization of the security
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Table 4.2: Real-Time Task Parameters for the UAV Control System
Task Function Period (ms)
Guidance Select the reference trajectory (i.e., altitude and
heading)
1000
Controller Execute closed-loop control functions (e.g., actuator
commands)
5000
Reconnaissance Read radar/camera data, collect sensitive information
and send data to the base control station
10000
Table 4.3: Security Tasks used in the Experiments
Task Function Mode
Check own binary of the
security routine
(Tripwire)
Scan files (viz., compare their hash value) in











Scan file-system library (/lib) ACTIVE
Monitor network traffic
(Bro)
Scan predefined network interface (en0) ACTIVE
and
PASSIVE
tasks did not exceed 50% of the total system utilization.
Experience and Evaluation
Performance Impact in Different Modes. In the first set of experiments, I measured the
average CPU load when the security tasks were executing in PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes. For
that, we executed the security tasks independently for 500 s in PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes
and observed the CPU load using /proc/stat interface (represents the y-axis of Fig. 4.5). As
Fig. 4.5 shows, running security tasks in ACTIVE mode increased the average CPU load compared
to running them in PASSIVE mode. This is because ACTIVE mode contains more security tasks
(e.g., 4 compared to 2, refer to Table 4.1) and they execute more frequently than in PASSIVE
mode. Because of the nature of applications, most RTS prefer predictability over performance.
The overhead of running security tasks in ACTIVE mode comes with increased security guarantees
that will suffice for many RTS.
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Figure 4.5: The CPU load when the security tasks executed in PASSIVE (top) and ACTIVE (bottom)
mode, respectively. The horizontal line represents average load over the observation duration
(500 s).
Impact on Detection Time. To study the detection performance I injected malicious code
into the system that mimics anomalous behaviors. I assumed that an attacker can take over6
one of the low-priority real-time tasks (referred to as the victim task) and is able to insert
malicious code that can execute with a privilege similar to that of legitimate tasks. I launched
the attack at both the network and host-level. I defined network-level DoS attacks as too many
rejected usernames and passwords submitted from a single address and used a real FTP DoS
trace [95] to demonstrate the attack. Malware (such as LRK, tOrn, Adore) in general-purpose
Linux environments causes damage to the system by modifying or overwriting the system binary
[96, Ch. 5]. Thus I follow a similar approach to demonstrate a host-level attack, viz., I injected
ARM shellcode [97] to override the victim task’s code and launched the attack by modifying the
contents in the file-system binary. I obtained the periods of the security tasks in both modes by
solving the period adaptation problem (Algorithm 4.1) and set it as the period of security tasks
(by using the Xenomai rt task set periodic() function). For each of the experiments, the work-
flow was as follows. I started with a clean (e.g., uncompromised) system state, launched the DoS
attack at any random time of the program execution and then injected the shellcode after a random
interval, and finally logged the time required by security tasks to detect the attacks. Initially the
security tasks ran in PASSIVE mode. When the network-level attack was suspected by the security
task (Bro), a mode change request was placed and the control was switched to ACTIVE mode with
the corresponding ACTIVE mode tasks (see Table 4.3). As mentioned in Section 4.2, my focus
is not on the effectiveness of a particular IDS here but on the effectiveness of integration of the
IDSes into RTS. Therefore I controlled the experimental environment so that the results were not
affected by the false positive/negative rates of the IDS used in the evaluation. In particular, both
of the launched attacks were detectable by the respective IDSes used in the evaluation. Detection
times were measured using ARM cycle counter registers (CCNT). To ensure the accuracy of the
6One way to override a task could be to use an approach similar to one presented in the literature [63] that exploits
the deterministic behavior of the real-time scheduling.
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Figure 4.6: The empirical distribution of time to detect the intrusions when mode change was
allowed vs when security tasks were run only in PASSIVE mode. I used ARM cycle counter registers
to measure the detection time. A total of 50 individual experiment instances were examined to
obtain the timing traces.
detection time measurements, I disabled all the frequency scaling features in the kernel (by using
the cpufrequtils utility) and allowed the platform to execute with a constant frequency (i.e., 1
GHz, the maximum frequency of our experimental platform).
I compared the performance of CONTEGO with an alternative approach that has no provision for
mode changes — that I refer to henceforth as the “opportunistic execution” scheme. In this scheme
the security tasks are run with the lowest priority (similar to the PASSIVE mode of operation in
CONTEGO). Specifically, I measured the time to detect both the host and network-level intrusions,
and plot the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of those detection times in Fig. 4.6.
The x-axis in Fig. 4.6 represents the detection time (in cycle count) and the y-axis represents the






I[ζi≤], where α is the total number of experimental observations, ζi is the time taken
to detect the attack in the i-th experimental observation, and  represents the x-axis values (viz.,
the detection times in cycle count) in Fig. 4.6. The indicator function I[·] outputs 1 if the condition
[·] is satisfied and 0 otherwise.
From Fig. 4.6 we can see that CONTEGO provides better detection time (i.e., fewer cycle counts
required to detect the intrusions). From my experiments I find that on average CONTEGO detects
attacks 27.29% faster than the reference scheme does. Opportunistic execution scheme allows the
security tasks to run only when other real-time tasks are not running, leading to more interference
(i.e., higher response times), and does not provide any mechanisms to adapt against abnormal
behaviors (e.g., the DoS attack in the experiments). In contrast, CONTEGO allows quick response
to anomalies (by switching to ACTIVE mode when a DoS attack is suspected). Since ACTIVE
security tasks can run with higher priority and less interference without impacting the timeliness
constraints of real-time tasks, CONTEGO had a superior detection rate in general for most of the
experiments without impacting safety.
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4.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I introduce a dual-mode framework, CONTEGO, to integrate security into legacy
single core RTS and provide a glimpse of security design metrics for RTS. I demonstrate the efficacy
of such integration mechanisms in a practical system and analyze the design trade-offs, both from
security and real-time perspectives. The framework presented in this chapter asserts one part of
my dissertation hypothesis (Section 1.1) since CONTEGO is a software-based technique that works
at the scheduler-level and allows the designers to integrate periodic security checks while retaining
real-time guarantees. I believe CONTEGO will provide valuable hints to the engineers on how to
enhance security into such safety-critical systems.
I note that CONTEGO targets single core systems since majority of legacy RTS are built on single
core chips. However, modern real-time CPS are migrating towards multicore platforms [23]. This
makes the problem of integrating security mechanisms more complex. This is because, multicore
platforms allow parallel execution of security tasks and designers have multiple choices for where
to allocate the security tasks. Chapter 5 addresses the problem of integrating security tasks in a
multicore setup.
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CHAPTER 5: A DESIGN-SPACE EXPLORATION FOR INTEGRATING
SECURITY TASKS IN MULTICORE REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
This chapter further asserts one part of my dissertation hypothesis (Section 1.1) and shows
the feasibility of integrating security monitoring mechanisms into multicore real-time platforms by
using time-aware scheduler-level techniques. Recall that the framework proposed in Chapter 4
(CONTEGO) targets single core systems. Despite the fact that most legacy real-time applications
are designed using platforms equipped with a single-core CPU, the trend towards multicore systems
can be seen as many off-the-shelf devices nowadays are built on top of a multicore environment [23].
As the use of multicore platforms in safety-critical RTS is increasingly becoming common, the focus
of this work is on integrating or retrofitting security mechanisms into multicore RTS. This makes the
problem of integrating security mechanisms more complex, as designers now have multiple choices
for where to allocate the security tasks. In this chapter I propose two design-time frameworks,
viz., HYDRA and HYDRA-C, that allows security tasks to operate with existing real-time tasks in
multicore platforms without perturbing system parameters or normal execution patterns. HYDRA
uses a static partitioning approach where security tasks are allocated to the cores (i.e., do not
migrate across cores at runtime). HYDRA-C, in contrast, executes security tasks in a “continuous”
manner — i.e., as often as possible, across cores. This is to ensure that any such mechanisms
run with few interruptions, if any. I evaluate HYDRA and HYDRA-C using a proof-of-concept
implementation with intrusion detection mechanisms as security tasks. I develop and use both, (a)
a custom intrusion detection system (IDS) as well as (b) Tripwire — an open source data integrity
checking tool. I find that my methods do not impact the schedulability and, on average, HYDRA-C
can detect intrusions 19.05% faster when compared to HYDRA without impacting the performance
of real-time tasks.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Multicore processors have found increased use in the design of modern RTS [23]. However,
the use of such processors increases the security problems (e.g., due to parallel execution of critical
tasks) [37]. In this chapter I evaluate design alternatives to improve the security posture of multicore
RTS through integration of “security tasks” while ensuring that the existing real-time tasks are
not affected by such integration. My focus here is to integrate security in an existing (e.g.,
legacy) system where it is harder to (a) modify the micro-architecture (say inclusion of extra
hardware/processor cores) or (b) change real-time task parameters (such as execution time and/or
period). Existing work that integrate security in RTS either focuses on single core systems (e.g., see
Chapter 4 and related work [10, 11, 42, 58, 59]) and/or require modification of system parameters
[10, 11, 13, 42, 58, 59] and thus are not applicable for systems where it is harder to change the
real-time task parameters. My main goal is to explore design mechanisms that can raise the
responsiveness of such monitoring tasks by increasing their frequency of execution. Unlike single
36
core systems, integrating security into multicore platforms is more challenging since designers have
multiple choices across cores (due to parallel execution of tasks) to retrofit security mechanisms.
For instance, one design choice could be statically assign cores for security tasks (in conjunction
with the real-time tasks). The challenge then is to determine core allocation and periods of the
security tasks. Another possibility is to execute them continuously across any available core to
provide better security monitoring and detection. As an example, consider an intrusion detection
system (IDS) e.g., that checks the integrity of file systems. If such a system is interrupted (before
it can complete entire checking), then an adversary could use that opportunity to intrude into the
system and, perhaps, stay resident in the part of the filesystem that has already been checked. If,
in contrast, the IDS task is able to execute with as few interruptions as possible (e.g., by moving
immediately to an empty core when it is interrupted), then there is much higher chance of successful
detection and correspondingly, a much lower chance of successful adversarial action.
In this chapter I present two design-time frameworks, HYDRA1 and HYDRA-C2, for partitioned3
RTS. I first start with static security integration policy (i.e., does not allow runtime migration),
HYDRA, and find a suitable core assignment of security tasks in order to ensure that they can
execute with a frequency close to what a designer expects (Section 5.3). As we shall see in Section 5.5,
this static partitioning of security tasks results in delayed detection of intrusions. I then extend
HYDRA with an alternate design method, HYDRA-C, that uses the concept of semi-partitioned
scheduling [31] to enable continuous execution of security tasks (i.e., execute as frequently as
possible) across cores without impacting the timing constraints of other, existing, real-time tasks
(Section 5.4).
Contributions. In this chapter I present the following contributions.
• Integrating security mechanisms in a multicore setup where changing existing real-time task
parameters is not an option.
• A mathematical model to jointly obtain the assignment of security tasks to respective cores
with execution frequency close to the desired values (Section 5.3).
• A mathematical model and iterative solution that allows security tasks to execute as
frequently as possible while still considering the schedulability constraints of other tasks
(Section 5.4).
I also present an implementation on a realistic ARM-based multicore rover platform
(Section 5.5.1) and carry out a design-space exploration to study the trade-offs for schedulability
and security (Section 5.5.2). My evaluation shows that HYDRA-C can achieve better execution
1In Greek mythology Hydra is a serpent with multiple heads. I refer to my scheme as HYDRA since I am trying
to maximize the potential across multiple ‘heads’ (cores).
2HYDRA-C stands for “HYDRA-Continuous”.
3Since this is the commonly used multicore scheduling approach for many commercial and open-source OSs (such
as OKL4 [98], QNX [99], real-time Linux [100], etc.) — mainly due to its simplicity and efficiency [101].
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frequency (consequently quicker intrusion detection) when compared with both fully-partitioned
(i.e., HYDRA) and global scheduling approaches while providing same or better schedulability.
Note: I do not target my frameworks towards any specific security mechanism — my focus is
to integrate any designer-provided security technique into a multicore-based RTS. I used Tripwire
and my in-house custom-developed malicious kernel module checker to demonstrate the feasibility
of my approach (Section 5.5) — the solutions proposed in this chapter is more broadly applicable
to other security mechanisms.
5.2 MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
5.2.1 Real-time Tasks and Scheduling Model
Consider a set of NR real-time tasks ΓR = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τNR}, scheduled on a multicore platform
with M identical cores M = {π1, π2, · · · , πM}. Each real-time task τr is represented by the tuple
(Cr, Tr, Dr) where Cr is the worst-case execution time (WCET), Tr is the minimum inter-arrival
time (i.e., period) and Dr is the relative deadline. In this work, I consider partitioned fixed-priority
preemptive scheduling [23] since (a) it does not introduce task migration costs and (b) it is widely
supported in many commercial and open-source real-time OSs (e.g., QNX, OKL4, real-time Linux,
etc.). I assume constrained deadlines for real-time tasks (i.e., Dr ≤ Tr) and the task priorities
are assigned according to rate-monotonic (RM) [80] order. All events in the system happen with
the precision of integer clock ticks. Real-time tasks are scheduled using partitioned fixed-priority
preemptive scheme [23, 101]. I further assume that the real-time tasks are schedulable, viz., the
worst-case response time (WCRT), denoted as Rr, is less than deadline. Therefore, the following
necessary and sufficient schedulability condition holds for each real-time tasks τr assigned to any
given core πm [101]:







Ci ≤ t, (5.1)
where hp(τr, πm) denotes the set of real-time tasks with higher priority than τr assigned to core
πm.
5.2.2 Security Task Integration
I now formally define security tasks. I propose to improve the security posture by integrating
additional NS periodic security tasks ΓS = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τNS} (i.e., tasks that are specifically
designed for monitoring purposes). I follow the sporadic security task model introduced earlier





where Cs is the WCET, T
des
s is the best period (minimum inter-arrival time) between successive
releases (i.e., F dess =
1
T dess
is the desired frequency for effective security monitoring and/or intrusion
detection) and Tmaxs is a designer provided upper bound of the period — if the period of the
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security task is larger than Tmaxs then the responsiveness is too low and security checking may
not be effective. Section 5.4 further relaxes the security task model and represents each security
task as (Cs, Ts, T
max
s ) to allow it execute as frequently as possible, across cores. I assume that
the priorities of of the security tasks are distinct and specified by the designers (e.g., derived
from specific security requirements). These tasks have implicit deadlines, i.e., they need to finish
execution before the next invocation. I also assume that task migration and context switch overhead
is negligible compared to the WCETs.
I first propose a mechanism, HYDRA, statically allocate security tasks to their respective cores
(Section 5.3). I then extend HYDRA with an alternative design choice (named HYDRA-C) that
allows runtime migration of security tasks (Section 5.4). As we shall see in Section 5.5, HYDRA-
C provides better security (i.e., faster detection time) and schedulability but comes with a cost
(increases context switch overhead).
5.3 HYDRA: FIXED ASSIGNMENT OF SECURITY TASKS
Recall that one way to integrate security mechanisms into existing systems without perturbing
real-time task behavior is to execute security tasks with the lowest priority as compared to the
real-time tasks (Chapter 4). Thus security tasks will execute opportunistically in the slack time
(e.g., when other real-time tasks are not running). As mentioned in Section 4.1, if the interval
between consecutive monitoring events is too large, the adversary may remain undetected and
harm the system between two invocations of the security task. In contrast, very frequent execution
of security tasks may impact the schedulability of the system (due to higher utilization). Since the
actual periods of the security tasks are not known and we need to adapt the periods to optimize
the trade-offs between schedulability and defense against intrusions.
I measure the security of the system by means of the achievable periodic monitoring and our
goal is to minimize the perturbation between the achievable (unknown) period Ts and the given
desired period T dess for all security tasks τs ∈ ΓS . Therefore I consider the following “tightness”





that represents how close the period of the security task is to its desired period. Note that the




≤ ηs ≤ 1. As mentioned earlier, if the interval between
consecutive monitoring events is too large, the adversary may remain undetected and harm the
system between two invocations of the security task. In contrast, very frequent execution of security
tasks may impact the schedulability of the system (due to higher utilization). The metric in Eq.
(5.2) allows me to measure how close the security tasks are able to get to their desired monitoring
frequencies.
One fundamental problem while integrating security mechanisms is to determine which security
tasks will be assigned to which core and executed when. Although security tasks can execute in any
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of the M available cores and any period T dess ≤ Ts ≤ Tmaxs is acceptable, the actual task-to-core
assignment and the periods of the security tasks are not known apriori. The goal of HYDRA
therefore is to jointly find the core-to-task assignment and suitable periods for security tasks. Note
that arbitrarily setting Ts = T
des
s for all (or some) security tasks τs ∈ ΓS may lead to the system
becoming unschedulable. This is because, low-priority security tasks may miss deadlines due to
interference from higher priority tasks. Also exhaustively finding all possible acceptable periods
for the security tasks for all available cores is not feasible. It will cause an exponential blow-up as
numbers of tasks and cores increase. For instance for a given taskset ΓS , there is a total of |M×Γs|
assignments possible4 (where A×B = {(a, b) | a ∈ A∧ b ∈ B} and | · | denotes set cardinality) and
for each combination the period for each security task τs ∈ ΓS can be any value within the range
[T dess , T
max
s ]. In order to address this combinatorial problem I obtain the periods of the security
tasks by framing it as an optimization problem.
5.3.1 Formulation as an Optimization Problem
Objective Function and Bounds on Period
Let me consider the vector X = [xms ]
T
∀τs∈ΓS ,∀πm∈M where x
m
s = 1 if τs is assigned to πm and 0
otherwise. Recall that my goal is to find a task assignment that minimizes the difference between
achievable and desired periods (e.g., maximize the tightness) for all the security tasks. Hence I
















where T = [Ts]
T
∀τs∈Γs is the (unknown) period vector that needs to be determined and ωs reflects
the priority (higher priority tasks would have large ωs). Besides, in order to satisfy the frequency
of periodic monitoring, the security task needs to satisfy the following constraint:
T dess ≤ Ts ≤ Tmaxs , ∀τs ∈ Γs. (5.4)
Finally, each security task must be assigned to exactly one core:
∑
πm∈M
xms = 1, ∀τs ∈ Γs.
Schedulability Constraint
Since the security tasks are executed with a priority lower that all real-time tasks, they will
suffer interference from all real-time and high priority security tasks executing in the same core.
Let hpS(τs) ⊂ ΓS denote the set of security tasks with a higher priority than τs. The worst-case
4For instance, when M = 8 cores and NS = 10 tasks there is a total of 3.518437208883×1013 possible assignments.
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release pattern of τs occurs when τs and all high-priority tasks are released simultaneously [81].
Using response time analysis [84] I calculate an upper bound to the interference experienced by τs




















where Imr = 1 if the real-time task τr is partitioned to core πm and 0 otherwise.
The first and second term in Eq. (5.5) represent the amount of interference from real-time and
high-priority security tasks, respectively. Note that the assignment of real-time tasks to cores is
known by assumption. In order to ensure that each security task τs will complete its execution
before its deadline on its assigned core, the following constraint needs to be satisfied:
Cs + I
m
s ≤ Ts, ∀τs ∈ Γs, ∀πm ∈M : xms = 1. (5.6)
The variables X and T in the above formulation turn the problem into a non-linear combinatorial
optimization problem that is NP-hard. I therefore propose an iterative algorithm HYDRA that
jointly finds the security tasks’ period and core assignment.5.
5.3.2 Algorithm
As mentioned earlier, jointly finding the security task assignment and periods is an NP-hard
problem. Even for fixed periods, finding the assignment for security tasks turns the problem
to a bin-packing problem that is known to be NP-hard [102]. Existing partitioning heuristics
(e.g., first-fit, best-fit, etc.) [23] are not directly applicable in our context since the real-time
requirements (e.g., minimize the number of cores so that all real-time tasks can meet deadlines) are
often different from the security requirements (e.g., execute security tasks more often to improve
intrusion detection rate without violating real-time constraints).
For a given task τs and allocation vector X, let us rewrite the optimization problem as follows:
max
Ts
ηs, Subject to: T
des
s ≤ Ts ≤ Tmaxs , Cs + Ims ≤ Ts. (5.7)
Notice that for a given assignment X (see Algorithm 5.1), the period Ts is the only variable (when
the Th,∀τh ∈ hpS(τs) is known) in Ims (see Eq. (5.5)). Although the period adaptation problem in
Eq. (5.7) is a constraint optimization problem it can be transformed into a convex optimization
problem (that is solvable in polynomial time). For details of this reformulation I refer the readers
5Appendix B.2 presents a comparison of my proposed iterative scheme with a brute force approach that
exhaustively searched for all possible combinations for a small setup (M = 2 cores and up to NS = 6 security
tasks). My experiments show that the performance degradation (in cumulative tightness) is less than 22% and that
may be acceptable given the exponential computational complexity of finding an optimal solution using exhaustive
search.
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Algorithm 5.1: HYDRA — Task Allocation and Period Adaptation
Input: Input taskset Γ = {ΓR ∪ ΓS} and the partition of real-time tasks I = [Imr ]T∀τr∈ΓR,∀πm∈M
Output: The security task allocation X = [xms ]
T
∀τs∈ΓS ,∀πm∈M and periods T = [Ts]
T
∀τs∈ΓS , if the taskset is
schedulable, Unschedulable otherwise.
1: Initialize xms := 0, ∀τs ∈ ΓS , ∀πm ∈M
2: for each security task τs ∈ ΓS (from higher to lower priority) do
3: for each core πm ∈M do
4: Solve the optimization problem in Eq. (5.7)
5: end for
6: Let M′s ⊆M is the set of core(s) for which the optimization problem is feasible
7: if M′s = ∅ then
8: /* Unable to find suitable period for τs */
9: return Unschedulable
10: end if




s is the tightness of τs obtained for πm
12: Set xm
∗
s := 1 /* Assign τs to πm∗ */




s is the period obtained by solving optimization for πm∗
14: end for
15: return (X,T) /* Return the allocation vector and periods */
to Appendix B.1.
The proposed HYDRA algorithm (summarized in Algorithm 5.1) works as follows. I start with
the highest priority security task τs and try to obtain the best period for each available core
πm ∈ M by solving the period adaptation problem introduced in Eq. (5.7) (Line 4). If there
exists a set of cores M′s ⊆ M for which the optimization problem is feasible (e.g., an optimal
period is obtained satisfying the real-time constraints) we pick the core πm∗ ∈ M′s that gives
the maximum tightness (Line 11) and allocate the security task to core πm∗ (Line 12). This will
ensure that the more critical security tasks will get a period close to the desired one. I repeat this
process for all security tasks to jointly obtain the assignment and periods. If for any security task
τj the set of available cores M′j is empty (e.g., the optimization problem is infeasible) we return
the taskset as unschedulable (Line 9) since it is not possible to find any suitable core with given
taskset parameters. This unschedulability result will provide hints to the designers to update the
parameters of security tasks (and/or the real-time tasks, if possible) in order to integrate security
for the target system.
5.4 HYDRA-C: CONTINUOUS SECURITY MONITORING
Recall from Section 5.1 that my goal is to explore the possible ways in which security could be
integrated in multicore-based real-time platforms. The HYDRA mechanism presented in Section 5.3
assumes that the real time tasks are distributed across all available cores. I now propose an
alternative design choice where I allow security tasks to continuously migrate at runtime (i.e., the
combined taskset with real-time and security tasks follows a semi-partitioned scheduling policy)











Schedule (with security task)
Core 0
Core 1
Real-time Task 1 (core 0)
Real-Time Task 2 (core 1)
Core idle (slack time)
Core 0
Core 1
Figure 5.1: Illustration of HYDRA-C for a dual-core platform: two real-time tasks (blue and green)
are statically assigned to two cores (core 0 and core 1, respectively). I propose to integrate a security
task (red) that will execute with lowest priority and can be migrated to ether core (whichever is
idle) at runtime.
running). I refer to this scheme as HYDRA-C. An illustration of HYDRA-C is presented in Fig. 5.1
where two real-time tasks (represented by blue and green rectangles) are partitioned into two cores
and a newly added security task (red rectangle) can move across cores. As we shall see in Section
5.5, allowing security tasks to execute on any available core will give us the opportunity to execute
security tasks more frequently (e.g., with shorter period) and that leads to better responsiveness
(faster intrusion detection time).
5.4.1 Period Selection
As mentioned earlier, one fundamental question is to figure out how often to execute security
tasks so that the system remains schedulable and also can execute within a designer provided
frequency bound (so that the security checking remains effective). Mathematically period selection




Ts, subject to Rs ≤ Ts ≤ Tmaxs , ∀τs ∈ ΓS . This is a non-trivial
optimization problem since the period of τs can be anything in [Rs, Tmaxs ] and the response time
Rs is a variable as it depends on the period of other higher priority security tasks. I first derive
the WCRT of the security tasks and use it as a (lower) bound to find the periods (Section 5.4.2).
Response Time Analysis
In the following I determine the response time of a job τks of security task τs using an iterative
method and the response time in each iteration is denoted by x.
Interference Caused by Real-Time Tasks. The interference Iτs←τi caused by a task τi on
τks is the number of time units in the busy period
6 when τi executes while τ
k
s does not. I first
6This is the maximal continuous time interval [t1, t2) until τ
k
s finishes where all the cores are executing either
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Figure 5.2: Workload of the real-time tasks for a window of size x. ai denotes the arrival time.
calculate the workload7 of the real-time tasks using the following lemma and use this to derive the
interference.
Lemma 5.1. The maximum workload of real-time tasks executed on a given core πm (in any
possible time interval of length x) is obtained when all real-time tasks are released synchronously
at the beginning of the interval.
Since real-time tasks are statically partitioned to cores and they have higher priority than
any task that is allowed to migrate between cores, their worst-case workload can be obtained
based on the critical instant [80] used for single-core fixed-priority scheduling case (formal proof in
Appendix B.3).
Let ΓπmR ⊆ ΓR denote the set of real-time tasks partitioned to core πm. Based on Lemma 5.1,
an upper bound to the workload of real-time tasks on πm can be obtained by assuming that each
real-time task τr is released at the beginning of the interval and each job of τr executes as early










WRi (x). Note that by definition, the interference caused by a group of tasks
executing on the same core πm on τs cannot be greater than x−Cs + 1. Therefore, the maximum











WRi (x), x− Cs + 1
)
. (5.8)
Interference Caused by Other Security Tasks. I next consider the workload of security
tasks with higher priority than τs. The workload computation for this case depends on the arrival
time of the task relative to the beginning of the busy period. Let me define a task τi as a carry-in
task (CI) if there exists one job of τi that has been released before the beginning of a given time
window of length x and executes within the window. If no such job exists, τi is referred to as a
non-carry-in task (NC).
To calculate the number of carry-in tasks, I extend the busy period of τks from its arrival time
(denoted by as) to an earlier time instance t0 (see Fig. 5.3) such that during any time instance
t ∈ [t0, as) all cores are busy executing tasks with higher priority than τs [103]. Note that by
higher priority tasks or τks itself.
7The workload Wi(w) of a task τi in a window of length w represents the accumulated execution time of τi within
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Figure 5.3: Busy period extension.
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of carry-in task for a window of size x.
definition, this implies that there was at least one free core (i.e., not executing higher priority
tasks) at time t0 − 1.
Lemma 5.2. At most M − 1 higher priority tasks can have carry-in at time t0.
Proof. The maximum number of higher priority tasks that can have carry-in at t0 is M−1 since by
definition there have to be strictly less than M higher priority tasks active at time t0−1 (otherwise
they will occupy all the cores). QED.
Since Lemma 5.2 holds for all tasks with higher priority than τs, an immediate corollary is
that the number of security tasks with carry-in at t0 also cannot be larger than M − 1. If a
security task τi does not have carry-in, its workload is maximized when the task is released at
the beginning of the busy interval. Hence, we can calculate the workload bound WSNCi (x) for the





Ci + min(x mod Ti, Ci). Likewise, the workload bound
for a carry-in security task τi in an interval of length x starting at t0 is given by (see Fig. 5.4):
WSCIi (x) = W
SNC
i (max(x− x̄i, 0)) + min(x,Ci − 1), where x̄i = Ci − 1 + Ti −Ri. We can bound
the workload of the first carry-in job to Ci − 1 because the job must have started executing at the
latest at t0− 1 (given that not all cores are busy). Finally, using the same argument as before, the
interference of τi can be bounded as follows: Iτs←τi(x,Wi(x)) = min (Wi(x), x− Cs + 1) , where
Wi(x) is either W
SNC
i (x) or W
SCI
i (x). Notice that the WCRT and periods of security task in
the carry-in workload function is actually an unknown parameter. However, I follow an iterative
scheme (Section 5.4.2) that allows me to calculate the period and WCRT of all higher priority
security tasks before I calculate the interference for task τs.
Response Time Calculation
Let hpS(τs) denote the set of security tasks with a higher priority than τs. Note that we do not
know which (at most) M − 1 security tasks in hpS(τs) have carry-in. In order to derive the WCRT
of τs, let us define Zτs ⊂ Γ×Γ as the set of all partitions of hpS(τs) into two subsets ΓNCs and ΓCIs
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(i.e., the non overlapping set of carry-in and non-carry-in tasks) such that:
ΓNCs ∩ ΓCIs = ∅,ΓNCs ∪ ΓCIs = hpS(τs), and |ΓCIs | ≤M − 1. (5.9)
For a given carry-in and non-carry-in set (i.e., ΓNCs and Γ
CI
s ), the total interference experienced







































+Cs. I solve this using an iterative fixed-point search with the initial condition
x(0) = Cs. The search terminates if there exists a solution (i.e., x = x
(l) = x(l−1) for some iteration
l) or when x(l) > Tmaxs for any iteration l since τs becomes trivially unschedulable for WCRT





Rs|(ΓNCs ,ΓCIs ). (5.11)
5.4.2 Algorithm
The security task τs remains schedulable with any period Ts ∈ [Rs, Tmaxs ]. However as mentioned
earlier, the calculation of Rs requires us to know the period and response time of other high priority
tasks τh ∈ hpS(τs). Also if we arbitrarily set Ts = Rs (since this allows us to execute security tasks
more frequently) it may negatively affect the schedulability of other tasks that are at a lower
priority than τs because of a high degree of interference from τs. Hence, I developed an iterative
algorithm that trades-off between schedulability and monitoring frequency.
My proposed solution (Algorithm 5.2) works as follows. I first fix the period of each security task
Tmaxs and calculate the response time Rs (Line 1). If there exists a task τj such that Rj > Tmaxj I
report the taskset as unschedulable (Line 3) since it is not possible to find a period for the security
tasks within the designer provided bounds — this unschedulability result will help the designer in
modifying the requirements (and perhaps real-time tasks’ parameters, if possible) accordingly to
integrate monitoring tasks for the target system. If the taskset is schedulable with Tmaxs , I then
optimize the periods from higher to lower priority order (Lines 5–8) and return the period (Line 9).
To be specific, for each task τs ∈ ΓS I perform a logarithmic search [104, Ch. 6] (see Algorithm
5.3 for the pseudocode) and find the minimum period T ∗s within the range [Rs, T
max
s ] such that all
low priority tasks (denoted as lp(τs)) remain schedulable, i.e., ∀τj ∈ lp(τs) : Rj ≤ Tmaxj (Line 7)
8Note that the worst-case is when the job arrives at t0 (i.e., as = t0).
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Algorithm 5.2: HYDRA-C — Period Selection
Input: Set of real-time and security tasks Γ = ΓR ∪ ΓS
Output: Periods of the security tasks, T (if the security tasks are schedulable); Unschedulable otherwise
1: Set Ts := T
max
s and calculate Rs for ∀τs ∈ ΓS
2: if ∃τs such that Rs > Tmaxs then
3: return Unschedulable
4: end if
5: for each security task τs ∈ ΓS (from higher to lower priority) do
6: /* Find period for which all lower priority tasks are schedulable */
7: Find minimum T ∗s ∈ [Rs, Tmaxs ] using Algorithm 5.3 such that all low priority task τj remain schedulable
(i.e., Rj ≤ Tmaxj ,∀τj)
8: end for
9: return T := [T ∗s ]∀τs∈ΓS /* return the periods */
Algorithm 5.3: Calculation of Minimum Feasible Period for τs
Input: Set of real-time and security tasks Γ = ΓR ∪ ΓS
Output: A feasible period T ∗s for the security task under analysis (i.e., τs)
1: Define T ls := Rs, T rs := Tmaxs , T cs := 0
2: Set T̂s := {Tmaxs } /* Initialize to store the set of feasible periods */
3: while T ls <= T
r
s do






5: if ∃τj ∈ lp(τs) such that τj is not schedulable with Ts = T cs then
6: /* Increase the period of τs to make the taskset schedulable (e.g., by reducing the interference) */




9: /* Taskset is schedulable with T cs */
10: T̂s := T̂s ∪ {T cs } /* Add T cs to the feasible period list */
11: /* Check schedulability with smaller period for next iteration */









/* Find the minimum feasible period */
16: return T ∗s /* return the period of τs */
and repeat the search for next security task.
5.5 EVALUATION
I evaluate HYDRA and HYDRA-C on two fronts: (i) a proof-of-concept implementation on an
ARM-based rover platform with security applications — to demonstrate the viability of my scheme
in a realistic setup (Section 5.5.1); and (ii) with synthetically generated workloads for broader
design-space exploration (Section 5.5.2). My implementation is available in a public, open-sourced
repository [105].
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Figure 5.5: Rover used in experiments.
5.5.1 Experiment with an Embedded Platform
I implemented my ideas on a rover platform (Fig. 5.5). The rover peripherals (e.g., wheel, motor,
servo, sensor) are controlled by a Raspberry Pi [106] single board computer. I used Linux kernel
4.9 and enabled real-time capabilities by applying the PREEMPT RT patch [100] (version 4.9.80-
rt62-v7+). My experiments were performed on a dual-core setup — this was done by setting the
flag maxcpus=2 in the boot command file /boot/cmdline.txt.
In my experiments the rover moved around autonomously and periodically captured and stored
images. I assumed implicit deadlines for real-time tasks and considered two tasks: (a) a navigation
task — that avoids obstacles using an infrared sensor and navigates (e.g., both driving and path-
planning) the rover and (b) a camera task that captures and stores still images. Parameters for the
navigation and camera tasks were (Cr, Tr): (240, 500) ms and (1120, 5000) ms, respectively (i.e.,
total real-time task utilization was 0.7040).
I introduced two security tasks: (a) an open-source security application, Tripwire [60], that checks
intrusions in the image data-store and (b) my custom security task that checks current kernel
modules (for detecting rootkits) and compares with an expected profile of modules. I modified
Tripwire configurations (/etc/tripwire/twpol.txt) and adapted it into periodic execution model.
The WCET of the security tasks were 5342 ms and 223 ms, respectively and the maximum
periods9 of security tasks were assumed to be 10000 ms (e.g., total system utilization is at least
0.7040 + 0.5565 = 1.2605). The system configurations and tools used in my experiments are
summarized in Table 5.1.
Experience and Evaluation
I observed the performance of HYDRA and HYDRA-C by analyzing how quickly an intrusion
can be detected. I considered the following two realistic attacks10: (i) an ARM shellcode [97] that
9I picked this maximum period value by trial and error so that the taskset became schedulable for demonstration
purposes.
10Note: my focus here is on the integration of any given security mechanisms rather the detection of any particular
class of intrusions. Hence I assumed that there were no zero-day attacks and the security tasks were able the detect
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Table 5.1: Summary of the Evaluation Platform
Artifact Configuration/Tools
Platform 1.2 GHz 64-bit Broadcom BCM2837 (Raspberry Pi 3)
CPU ARM Cortex-A53
Memory 1 Gigabyte
Operating System Debian Linux (Raspbian Stretch Lite)
Kernel version Linux Kernel 4.9
Real-time patch PREEMPT RT 4.9.80-rt62-v7+
Kernel flags CONFIG PREEMPT RT FULL enabled
Boot parameters maxcpus=2, force turbo=1, arm freq=700,
arm freq min=700
WCET measurement ARM cycle counter registers
















































Figure 5.6: Experiments with rover platform: (a) time (cycle counts) to detect
intrusions; (b) average number of context switches. On average HYDRA-C can detect the intrusions
faster without impacting the performance of real-time tasks.
allows the attacker to modify the contents of the image data-store — this attack can be detected
by Tripwire; (ii) a rootkit [107] that intercepts all the read() system calls — my custom security
task can detect the presence of the malicious kernel module. In Fig. 5.6a I show the average time
to detect both the intrusions (in terms of cycle counts, collected from 35 trials) for HYDRA-C
and HYDRA schemes. From my experiments I found that, on average, HYDRA-C can detect
intrusions 19.05% faster compared to the HYDRA approach (Fig. 5.6a). Since HYDRA-C allows
security tasks to migrate across cores, it has shorter periods and that leads to faster detection
times.
I next measured the overhead of our security integration approach in terms of number of context
switches. For each of the trials I observed the schedule for 45 seconds and counted the number
of context switches using the Linux perf tool [72]. In Fig. 5.6b I show the number of context
switches (y-axis) for HYDRA-C and HYDRA schemes (for 35 trials). As shown in the figure,
HYDRA-C increases the number of context switches (since I permit migration across cores). From
the corresponding attacks correctly.
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my experiments I found that, on average, HYDRA-C increases context switches by 1.75 times.
However, this increased context switch overhead does not impact the deadlines of real-time tasks
(since the security tasks always execute with a priority lower than the real-time tasks) and thus
may be acceptable for many real-time applications.
5.5.2 Experiment with Synthetic Tasksets
I also conducted experiments with randomly generated workloads for broader design-space
exploration. I considered M ∈ {2, 4} cores and each taskset instance contained [3 ×M, 10 ×M ]
real-time and [2×M, 5×M ] security tasks. I only considered schedulable real-time tasksets. Each
real-time task had periods between [10, 1000] ms and the maximum periods for security tasks were
selected from [1500, 3000] ms. I assumed that real-time tasks were partitioned using a best-fit [101]
strategy. The utilization of individual tasks were generated using Randfixedsum algorithm [108]
and total utilization of the security tasks was at least 30% of the system utilization.
Impact on Schedulability and Security Trade-off
While in this work I consider a legacy system (where real-time tasks are partitioned to cores),
for comparison purposes I considered the following two schemes (in addition to HYDRA) that do
not consider any period adaptation for security tasks.
• GLOBAL-TMax: In this scheme all the real-time and security tasks are scheduled using a global
fixed-priority multicore scheduling scheme11 [23]. Since my focus here is on schedulability I
set Ts = T
max
s , ∀τs ∈ ΓS . This scheme allows me to observe the performance impacts of
binding real-time tasks to the cores (due to legacy compatibility).
• HYDRA-TMax: This is similar to the HYDRA approach introduced in Section 5.3 but instead
of minimizing periods here we set Ts = T
max
s , ∀τs. This allows me to observe the trade-offs
between schedulability and security in a fully-partitioned system.
In Fig. 5.7 I compare the performance of HYDRA-C with the HYDRA, GLOBAL-TMax and
HYDRA-TMax strategies in terms of acceptance ratio (y-axis) defined as the number of schedulable
tasksets over the generated ones. As we can see from the figure, HYDRA-C outperforms HYDRA
when the normalized utilization
∑
Ci/Ti
M (x-axis) increases. HYDRA-C allows security tasks to
execute in parallel across cores and also allocate periods considering the schedulability constrains
of all low priority tasks — this results in a smaller response times and can find more tasksets
11I note that there exists recent work [109] that aims to reduce pessimism of multicore schedulability analysis by
dividing task WCET into two virtual partitions and then calculating response times by enumerating all possible
partitions. Given the workload of real-time and security tasks, my interference calculations (Section 5.4.1) can be
adopted to such a two-partitions method. However, from my experiments I found that this extra complexity (i.e.,
enumerating all WCET partitions) does not improve the schedulability any further.
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Figure 5.7: Impact on schedulability and security. The acceptance ratio vs taskset utilizations
for 2 and 4 core platforms: HYDRA-C outperforms HYDRA and GLOBAL-TMax approaches for
higher utilizations.
that satisfy the designer specified bound. In contrast, HYDRA uses a greedy approach that
minimizes the periods of higher priority tasks first without considering the global state. Also
HYDRA statically binds the security task to the core and hence suffers interference from the higher
priority tasks assigned to that core — this leads to lower acceptance ratios. For higher utilizations
HYDRA-C can find schedulable tasksets that can not be easily partitioned by using the HYDRA-
TMax scheme. The acceptance ratio of HYDRA-C and the HYDRA-TMax scheme is equal when
utilization less than 0.7 since some lower priority security tasks experience less interference due to
longer periods and specific core assignment. While I bind the real-time tasks to cores (due to legacy
compatibility), it does not affect the schedulability since real-time tasks are already schedulable
when partitioned and my analysis reduces the interference that real-time tasks have on security
ones. I also highlight that while my approach results in better schedulability, HYDRA-C/HYDRA-
TMax and GLOBAL-TMax schemes are incomparable in general (i.e., there exists tasksets that
may be schedulable by task partitioning but not in global scheme and vice-versa) — I allow security
tasks to migrate due to security requirements (e.g., to achieve faster intrusion detection — as I
explain in the next experiments, see Fig. 5.8).
In the final set of experiments (Fig. 5.8) I compare the achievable periods (in terms of Euclidean
distance) for my approach and the other schemes. The x-axis in the Fig. 5.8 shows the normalized
utilizations and the y-axis represents the average difference between the following period vectors
T∗ = [T ∗s ]∀τs∈ΓS : (a) HYDRA-C and HYDRA (dashed line); (b) HYDRA-C and other strategies
(e.g., GLOBAL-TMax and HYDRA-TMax) that do not consider period minimization (dotted
marker). Higher distance values imply that the periods calculated by HYDRA-C are smaller (i.e.,
leads to faster detection time) and HYDRA-C outperforms the other scheme. For low to medium
utilizations HYDRA-C performs better when compared to HYDRA. In situations with higher
utilizations, the lesser availability of slack time results in HYDRA-C and HYDRA performing in
a similar manner. My experiments show that HYDRA-C achieves better continuous monitoring
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Figure 5.8: Difference in period vectors for HYDRA-C and reference schemes (e.g., HYDRA,
GLOBAL-TMax, HYDRA-TMax): the non-negative distance (y-axis in the figure) implies that
HYDRA-C finds shorter periods than other schemes.
when compared with both a fully-partitioned approach (HYDRA, HYDRA-TMax) and a global
scheduling approach (GLOBAL-TMax) while providing the same or better schedulability.
5.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter presents an evaluation of design choices (HYDRA and HYDRA-C) for integrating
security tasks into a multicore RTS. Since I provide comparisons of my solution with two extremes
— an static assignment strategy and continuous execution policy that allows runtime migration
— this work provides valuable hints to designers on how to build security into such systems. By
using my framework, engineers can now evaluate the design choices of such integration techniques
to improve the overall security (and hence, safety) of the systems.
In Chapters 4–5 I present pure software-based real-time security integration techniques and
assert one part of my dissertation hypothesis (Section 1.1). When both real-time and security
tasks are executed on a same platform, an attacker may compromise the underlying host system
and prevent the security checks to be successful.12 In the follow-up work (Chapter 6), I address this
issue by leveraging hardware-assisted security features available in modern embedded processors.
In particular, I use a trusted (and verified) computing module and execute the security checks
inside a secure enclave. This mechanism ensures that even if the (potentially untrusted) real-time
tasks are compromised, an adversary can not send false signals. The proposed framework, SCATE
(Chapter 6), reason out my dissertation hypothesis since I show the feasibility of integrating security
checks by using time-aware hardware/software-based techniques.
12I discuss this issue further in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 6: SELECTIVE CHECKING AND TRUSTED EXECUTION TO
PREVENT FALSE ACTUATIONS IN REAL-TIME CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
So far I have presented software-based security integration techniques — this asserts one part
of my dissertation hypothesis (Section 1.1). I now reason out my hypothesis by presenting a time-
aware software/hardware-based real-time security integration framework. In particular, I leverage
the capabilities of hardware-assisted security features, viz., the ARM TrustZone [25] and design
a targeted security measure (i.e., techniques that prevent falsification of actuation commands).
Cyber-physical applications can be vulnerable to attacks that target outgoing actuation commands,
i.e., ones that modify the behavior of their physical systems. The limited resources in such systems,
coupled with their stringent timing constraints, often prevents the checking of every outgoing
command. In this chapter I present a “selective checking” mechanism that uses game-theoretic
modeling [110] to identify the right subset of commands to be checked in order to deter an adversary.
This mechanism is coupled with a “delay-aware” trusted environment (using TrustZone) to ensure
that only verified actuation commands are ever sent to the physical system, thus maintaining
their safety and integrity. The selective checking and trusted execution (SCATE) framework is
implemented on an off-the-shelf ARM platform running standard embedded Linux. I demonstrate
the effectivness of SCATE using four realistic cyber-physical systems (a ground rover, a flight
controller, a robotic arm and an automated syringe pump) and study design tradeoffs. Not only
does SCATE provide a high level of security that can almost match the performance of a fine-
grained mechanism (i.e., one that checks all actuation commands), it also suffers significantly
lesser overheads (30.48%–47.32% less) in the process. In fact, SCATE can work with more systems
than its fine-grained counterpart since the latter causes timing delays that negatively affect the
safety of the system. Considering that most CPS do not have any such checking mechanisms, and
SCATE is guaranteed to meet all the timing requirements (i.e., ensure the safety/integrity of the
system), my methods can significantly improve the security (and, hence, safety) of the system.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Modern cyber-physical applications with real-time requirements are increasingly becoming
targets for cyber-attacks. The traditional approaches of air-gapping such systems [13, 18] or
using proprietary protocols and hardware [12] have been found wanting in the face of recent high-
profile attacks: e.g., Stuxnet [3], attack demonstrations by researchers on medical devices [7] and
automobiles [6], denial-of-service (DoS) attacks mounted from IoT devices [111], among others. A
common thread among all of the aforemention attacks, especially ones that threaten the physical
safety of the system, is the falsification of actuation commands — i.e., commands that control
the state of the physical system are either modified or replaced while in transit to the physical
component. Note that CPS are comprised of a tight interplay between computation, control
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and communication. At its core, a cyber-physical “plant” consists of actuators and sensors that,
respectively, monitor and control the physical properties of the system. Due to the tight coupling
between actuators and physical plants, such systems are often vulnerable to unexpected situations
(e.g., malicious actions) that were not considered during the design/development phases [112].
Hence, sending false/spoofed commands to the actuators can disrupt the normal operation of the
physical plant and jeopardize its safety. For instance, an industrial robot on a manufacturing line,
must carry out its operation (e.g., placing an object on a conveyor) in 50–100 ms [2]. Failure to
do so, could disrupt the entire manufacturing operation and even put the safety of the plant and
human operators at risk. If an attacker could modify the command that changes the angle of
rotation of the robot arm, the robot may completely miss the conveyor and, potentially, crash the
entire system.
In this work I intend to check actuation commands before they can affect the state of the physical
system. If I find that the command can have negative effects, i.e., it compromises the safety and/or
integrity of the CPS, then my proposed technique prevents it from being sent out1 To prevent
tampering, I implement the checking mechanism in a trusted execution environment (TEE) that is
available on modern commodity processors, viz., the ARM TrustZone [25].2
In an ideal scenario, every outgoing actuation command should be checked. A serious hurdle
that prevents such a strategy is that, as mentioned earlier, CPS have stringent timing requirements
— very often the actuation command, once sent out, must be received by the physical system in a
short, fixed, amount of time. This limits the amount of time delays that can be introduced during
the checking process. In addition, the control software has its own timing constraints, e.g., it must
complete execution before a certain “deadline”; failure to do so can also cause instability in the
system. Hence, we cannot check (and hence, delay) every command since each check compounds
the delays faced by the software. In addition, as seen in Section 6.3.1 the use of the TEE-based
checking mechanims introduces additional delays due to context-switch overheads, further affecting
the deadlines. Hence, there is a need to carefully consider how many and which actuation commands
are to be checked — to ensure that (a) the system safety/timing requirements are met and (b) also
deter attackers. Picking a fixed subset of actuation commands is not helpful since an adversary can
circumvent the checks by targeting the “unchecked” commands. To this end, I develop a mechanism
to validate a random subset of commands, varying at run-time that significantly increases the
difficulty for would-be attackers. I use a game-theoretic formulation of a two-player normal-form
game [26, 114, 115] for the “selective checking” of the actuation commands (Section 6.4). The
combined framework is referred to as the selective checking and trusted environment (SCATE)
system.
Contributions. In this chapter I make the following contributions:
• I present a framework, SCATE, that protects cyber-physical systems from attacks that falsify
1Note that the actions taken when we detect a problematic actuation command is orthogonal to the work presented
here and depends on the specific CPS. I briefly discuss some of these strategies in Section 7.
2This does not preclude the use of other TEEs, e.g., Intel SGX [113].
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/* other computation */
...
/* actuation request */
set_speed(val)
...






Figure 6.1: Illustration of a vanilla (non-secure) execution scenario that does not check actuation
commands.
actuation commands. [Section 6.2.3]
• I use a combination of game-theoretic analysis and a trusted execution environment to deter
attackers, significantly reduce checking overheads and still guarantee the safety and integrity
of the CPS. [Section 6.4]
I implemented SCATE [Section 6.5] on a commercially available ARM Cortex A53 platform [106]
and commodity TEE (TrustZone [25]) running embedded Linux. My system and techniques
were evaluated using four realistic, standardized, cyber-physical systems [Section 6.5.2]: (a)
an autonomous ground rover, (b) a flight controller, (c) a robotic arm (typically found in
manufacturing systems) and (d) a syringe pump used in medical devices. I also carried out a
broader design space exploration [Section 6.5.3] using simulated workloads and also analyzed the
trade-offs between security and timing/safety properties. Not only does SCATE deter attacks, it
is able to do so with significantly less overheads and also guarantee that it will not compromise
the system safety and timing properties. My open-sourced implementation is available in a public
repository [116].
6.2 MOTIVATION, OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
6.2.1 The Requirement for Checking Actuation Commands
Real-time CPS consists of cyber components and physical components. The cyber units perform
the computing for estimation of the system state (e.g., location of the unmanned vehicle and the
direction of its movement) and generation of appropriate control signals for the actuators. The
physical components include the entities that are closer to the physical system under observation
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of control spoofing attacks on a rover platform: (a) high-level schematic
of my experiment setup where a rover performs a line following mission and an adversary triggers
malicious code that turns off one of the rover motors; (b) readings from rover motor encoders
under control spoofing attack. Without proper checking, an adversary can inject erroneous signals
(shaded region in Fig. 6.2b) and deviate the rover from its expected behavior (dashed line). In this
setup the rover stalled in the middle of its mission due to control spoofing attack as shown by the
constant readings from wheel motors).
In a non-secure system, when a task generates actuation command, it is being directly issued to
the physical actuators. Figure 6.1 illustrates this: when a controller tasks generates an actuation
command (to set the speed of the motor) it directly changes the speed without checking whether the
speed value is legitimate or not. Without explicit control and verification over actuation process,
it is possible to send arbitrary signals to the actuators and an adversary can drive the system in
undesirable ways. For instance, consider ground rovers that can be used in multiple cyber-physical
applications such as remote surveillance, agriculture and manufacturing [46]. For demonstration
purposes, I use a COTS-based ground rover running an embedded variant of Linux on an ARM
Cortex-A53 platform (Raspberry Pi [106]). The rover is equipped with two optical encoders that
are connected to the motors (i.e., actuator in this setup); it can turn left by switching off the right
encoder and vice-versa.
As depicted in Fig. 6.2a, I carried-out a line-following mission where the rover steered from an
initial location to a target location by following a line. A controller task runs the standard, pre-
packaged, proportional–integral–derivative (PID) closed-loop control [117]. A 5-byte value is sent to
the actuator (via memory-mapped registers) to control the wheel motors via the I2C interface [118].
This aids in the navigation and control of the rover. The x-axis of Fig. 6.2 shows the time and
the y-axis is the total distance traveled by the rover (i.e., readings from the wheel motors). Since
the vendor implementation of the controller does not verify control commands, I was able to inject
a logic bomb and send spoofed commands to turn off the motor (marked in the figure). As a
result, the rover deviates from its mission. The dashed line (after 17 seconds) shows the expected
behavior (viz., without any attack) as a reference (obtained by running a linear regression test
from the traces of the uncompromised execution). As the shaded region in the figure shows, the
encoder readings (i.e., traversed distance) remained same and the rover was not following the line
under the presence of the attack that. I note that designing and scheduling checking techniques for
real-time cyber-physical platforms is often more challenging when compared to the general-purpose
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/* other computation */
...
/* actuation request */
set_speed(val)
...






/* check request */
if val is within 
threshold:







Figure 6.3: Flow of operation in SCATE. When a task generates any actuation command, it will
be checked by a trusted entity leveraging TEE technologies (say ARM TrustZone [25]). In this
illustration the speed of the actuators (motors attached to the wheels) is only set if the speed value
is within a predefined range.
systems due to additional timing/safety constraints (see Table 6.3 for related examples) imposed
by such systems. To the best of my knowledge, there is no existing technique that can be directly
retrofitted to solve this problem. I believe there is a practical requirement and intellectual merit
for designing framework that can protect actuators in real-time CPS and hence is the focus of this
research.
6.2.2 System Model
I consider a set of priority-driven, periodic real-time tasks, Γ, running on a multicore CPS
platform Π. The set of tasks Γp ⊂ Γ running on a given core πp ∈ Π is fixed and given by the
designers. Each task τi issues Ni number of actuation requests. I assume that there is a designer-
given quality-of-service (QoS) requirement that Nmini ≤ Ni actuation requests (among total Ni
number of requests) must be checked (by the trusted entity running inside TEE) for each invocation
of a task. I further assume that each actuation command aji is associated a designer-provided weight
ωji that represents the importance/preference of checking the corresponding command over other.
Higher weight imply that the actuation request is more critical and designers want to examine it
more often. I provide a formal representation of my task and real-time model in Appendix C.1.
6.2.3 Problem Overview and Proposed Approach
Actuation commands that are malicious can jeopardize the safety and integrity of cyber-physical
applications. In this research I propose techniques to protect systems from control spoofing attacks
by examining actuation commands before they are being issued to physical peripherals. I name this
framework, SCATE where I consider cyber-physical applications consisting of software tasks that
can have two different types of execution sections: (a) regular (potentially untrusted) execution
57











Normal Execution Mode Trusted Execution Mode











Normal Execution Mode Trusted Execution Mode
….
Task Instance 1 Task Instance 2
Figure 6.4: Random selection of actuation commands for checking.
section where normal executions are carried-out and (b) trusted sections where critical information
(i.e., actuation events) are examined. The high-level schematic of SCATE is depicted in Fig. 6.3.
When a task issues actuation command, SCATE transfers the control to secure mode using
TrustZone SMC instructions. In the secure mode a designer-given trusted entity checks the
actuation commands. In this work I assume that my checking module uses policy rules that
defines the mapping of various system states and corresponding legitimate actuation events (refer
to Section 6.3 for details). Note that although I use ARM TrustZone as the underlying TEE to
demonstrate my ideas, other trusted environments can be used in SCATE without loss of generality.
As we shall see in Section 6.3.1, the context switch overhead for switching between normal
and trusted modes is not negligible. For example, consider the rover used in my experiments
(Section 6.5). The control loop frequency of the controller task is 5 Hz (200 ms) and it generates
four actuation commands (to set the speeds and direction of attached motors). The controller task
must complete execution before its sampling interval (200 ms). If we check the speed and direction
values of each of the four commands using TrustZone, the controller task fails to comply with its
timing requirements (since it requires 261 ms to finish). For such situations (i.e., when not all the
commands can be verified while respecting timing guarantees for all the tasks), SCATE selectively
checks a subset of actuation events. For this, I leverage the tools from game theory [26, 114] and
randomly select a subset of commands (for checking) in each job of a task that provides us a
trade-off between security and timing guarantees (see Section 6.4 for details). Figure 6.3 shows
an illustrative case where a tasks generates three actuation requests and we can check at most
two request to comply with timing/safety requirements. In this case SCATE randomly checks two
commands in different task instances (e.g., command (2, 3) in first instance and command (1, 3)
in second instance). From earlier rover example, by reducing the number of checks to half3 (e.g.,
randomly checks two commands in each task instances instead of all four), SCATE manages to
finish the controller task before 200 ms without significantly degrading security (e.g., on average,
SCATE requires one additional task instances to detect an attack when compared to the scheme
that checks all four commands).
3Section 6.5 presents details of this experimental setup and additional results.
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6.2.4 Background
I now provide background on the TEE technology (ARM TrustZone [25]) and the game-theoretic
modeling tool [26]) used in this work.
Trusted Environments and ARM TrustZone
Trusted environments are set of hardware and software-based security extensions where the
processors maintain a separated subsystem in addition to the traditional OS (also called rich
OS) components. TEE technology has been implemented on commercial hardware such as ARM
TrustZone [25] and Intel SGX [113]. In this work I consider TrustZone as the building block of
our model due to wide usage of ARM processors in CPS. I note that although I use the TrustZone
functionality for demonstration purposes, my ideas are rather general and can be adapted to other
TEE technology without loss of generality.
TrustZone contains two different privilege blocks: (i) regular (non-secure) execution environment,
called “Normal World” (NW) and (ii) a trusted environment, referred to as “Secure World” (SW).
The NW is the untrusted environment that runs a commodity untrusted OS (called rich OS)
whereas SW is a protected computing block that only runs privileged instructions. TrustZone
hardware ensures that the resources in the SW can not be accessed from the NW. These two
worlds are bridged via a software module, the secure monitor. The context switch between the NW
and SW is performed via a secure monitor call (SMC).
Normal-Form Games
The overheads for TEE context switch is costly (Section 6.3.1). If a task cannot verify all
the actuation commands, I propose to select only a subset of commands in each job for checking.
For this, I leverage the tools from game theory [110] to ensure that the chosen subsets are non-
deterministic, at least from the adversary’s point of view (see Section 6.4 for details). In multi-
agent systems, if the optimal action for one agent to take depends on the actions that the other
agents take, game theory is used to analyze how an agent should behave in such settings. In a
normal-form game [26], every player j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , J} has a set of strategies (or actions) σj and
a utility function uj : σ1 × σ2 × · · · × σJ → R that maps every outcome (a vector consisting
of a strategy for every player) to a real number. As we shall see in Section 6.4.1, I formulate
this problem as a two-player game (e.g., system designer and adversary). The output of the
game finds the probability distribution over the player’s strategies (i.e., fraction of time a given
strategy is selected in the game) that leads to optimal outcome. While game-theoretic analysis has
been used in other modeling problems (e.g., patrolling [115], network routing [119], transportation
systems [120], tracking information flows [48], decision making [50]), to the best of my knowledge
this is the first work that uses normal-form games in the real-time security context.
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Figure 6.5: (a) State → Action mapping used in SCATE for checking actuation commands. (b)
Example states and corresponding valid actuation commands for a line-following rover.
6.3 CHECKING ACTUATION COMMANDS
In SCATE a “checking module” executes inside the trusted environment. The checking module
observes system states and decides whether a given actuation command is legitimate or malicious.
Recall that when a task issues actuation requests, SCATE transfers control to the secure execution
mode using TrustZone SMC instructions. In particular, for a given real-time platform I assume
that there exists a CheckAct(τi, a
j
i , t) function
4 that examines a given actuation command aji
(where 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni, Ni is total number of commands the task issues) generated by a task
τi at a given time t. As shown in Fig. 6.5a, the checking module uses policy abstraction
rules [121], viz., State → Action pairs where the State predicate represents a given system
state and Action denotes corresponding valid actuation command(s). In particular, I assume
that when τi executes an actuation command, function CheckAct(τi, a
j
i , t) first observes system
state S(t) and then decides whether the actuation command aji is valid for the current state
S(t). For instance, consider the line-following rover presented in Section 6.2.1. The directions
for the wheels of the rover (i.e., forward, left and right; controlled by the attached motors) are
the actuation commands. At any given point of time, the rover can be in one of three states:
S = {ON LINE,LEFT OF LINE,RIGHT OF LINE} that denotes whether the rover is on top
of the line or shifted left/right of the line, respectively. The rover controller task performs the
following actuation operations (i.e., actions): move left()/move right() (move the rover left/right,
respectively) and move forward() (drive the rover forward). The corresponding State → Action
mapping for this rover is illustrated in Fig. 6.5b. If the rover is on left side of the line (i.e.,
State = LEFT OF LINE), the valid command should be move right() (i.e., shift the rover back
to the line so that it stays on the line) and if the rover is on top the line (i.e., State = ON LINE),
the controller task should drive it forward (i.e., issue move forward() command).
Table 6.1 summarizes the possible checks for various real-time platforms — however, this is by
4The exact function depends on the specific CPS and application requirements.
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(a) Check if the robot is following the mission; (b) allow only
predefined number of actuation commands per period
Robotic arm Manufacturing Servo,
buzzer
(a) Check the servo pulse sequences matches with the desired






(a) Drive the motor only to allowable positions/rates (b)









(a) Send high pulse to buzzer only if water-level is high/air
quality abnormal/detect smoke; (b) do not display alert if the






(a) Trigger alarm only if there is an impact/object detected in
camera; (b) rotate camera (using servos) only within allowable
pan/tilt angle
*Platforms listed in shaded rows are implemented and evaluated in this work. Other examples are presented here to illustrate
applicability of my ideas for multiple use-cases.
no stretch meant to an exhaustive list. I assume that State → Action rules are given by the
designers based on system requirements. I note that the ideas presented here are agnostic to the
specific checking method and SCATE is compatible with existing techniques (e.g., defining rules
at design times [62, 122], deriving from specifications [123] and based on statistical analysis [74].)
In this work I focus on how to selectively examine random subsets of actuation commands by
using designer-provided checking rules. In Section 6.5.2 I describe implementation of CheckAct()
functions for four realistic platforms used in my evaluation.
6.3.1 The Requirement for Coarse-Grain Checking
In order to check actuation commands we must ensure that SCATE should not cause inordinate
delays and the timing requirements of real-time tasks are satisfied (i.e., they complete execution
before deadlines). I therefore develop design-time tests (see Appendix C.2) that ensure tasks
meet their timing requirements (deadlines). My analysis in Appendix C.2 shows that there is an
overhead for inspecting the actuation commands using TEEs and a task may miss its timing/safety
requirements. As I mentioned earlier, any failure to meet timing requirements disrupts the stability
of the system and can be catastrophic. For instance, consider the rover example from Section 6.2.3.
If the controller task fails to issue navigation commands before the time limit, the rover may
stall, or worse, may not be able to steer properly and even crash. Hence, delays caused by the
checking mechanisms can also result in such problems. Table 6.3 presents additional examples for
the possible consequences when tasks are unable to meet their timing requirements.
Existing work [124–126] show that although TEEs are implemented on hardware, they can still
cause significant overheads — this is particularly acute in real-time applications. For instance,
consider the Linux-based TrustZone port, OP-TEE [127] supported on many embedded platforms.
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My experiments show that the overhead of switching between normal to trusted mode is around
66 ms for Raspberry Pi platform. For completeness, I also performed experiments on an ARMv8-
M Cortex-M33 architecture using ARM FVP libraries [128] where the regular applications were
running on FreeRTOS [94] and trusted mode codes were executed on bare-metal. I find that
the mode switching delays in this setup are 2 ms. I note that the delays are higher in Linux
environment due to extra overheads (i.e., execution of sequence of API calls [124]) imposed by
Linux kernel and OP-TEE secure OS. Although the overheads of secure calls (SMC) for switching
between regular and trusted modes are platform-specific, it may not be feasible to check multiple
actuation commands while retaining real-time guarantees. For example, if a task operates at 50
Hz (i.e., required to finish before 20 ms) [63] and regular computation takes 10 ms, the FreeRTOS-
based setup allows at most 5 checks to comply with timing requirements. Likewise, for applications
running on a Linux and OP-TEE-based Raspberry Pi platform (Section 6.5.2), we can check at
most 3 commands per instance if the controller task operates at 5 Hz. We therefore need smart
techniques, say where only a subset of commands are vetted for each instances while maintaining
security guarantees, to support TEE-based checking for real-time applications. I now present my
methods to achieve this (based on game-theoretic analysis) in the following section.
6.4 GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR RANDOM CHECKING
As checking all (or most of the) actuation commands can jeopardize the safety of the real-time
tasks, I now propose a mechanism to deal with this issue of monitoring overheads. I consider
the case when there exists a task τi such that τi cannot perform all the Ni checking before its
deadline (denoted by Di). One option to reduce the number of checks is to verify only a subset of
commands so that the task can finish before its deadline. That is, check a subset of commands,
Ki, (N
min
i ≤ Ki < Ni) such that RTEEi ≤ Di, ∀τi ∈ Γ where RTEEi is the response time (i.e.,
time between task arrival to completion). The challenge is then to decide which subset of Ki
(among Ni) actuation requests should be selected for checking in each task τi. In addition, if we
check only fixed Ki commands and an adversary jeopardizes some or all of the remaining Ni −Ki
requests, then the attack will succeed and remain undetected. To balance the security and real-time
requirements, SCATE randomly selects different subsets of requests for checking. In particular, at
each task instances SCATE randomly picks a set of Ki commands with pre-computed probability
distributions. While I pick a subset of commands, it should look like (to adversary) that SCATE is
checking it all. As a result, it will be difficult for an attacker to identify which subset of requests are
selected for checking in evading detection and thus less chances of success — since each instance
of a task will select a different subset of requests for vetting. As we shall see in Section 6.4.1
I formulate this problem as a two-player game [26] and develop Algorithm 6.1 to determine the
feasible number of Ki inspection points that provide similar level of security. I now illustrate my
ideas with a simple example.
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Intuition and Example. Let us consider a ground rover performing a line-following mission.
The rover controller task (τc) generates the following actuation requests (Nc = 3): (a) setEncL(val)
and setEncR(val) that set the speed of left and right motor encoders, respectively (denoted by a
1
c
and a2c); (b) setNav(cmd) that issues a navigation command where each cmd specifies values to the
peripheral registers for navigating the rover forward, backward, left and right direction (denoted
by a3c). Recall from the description of the system model that there exists designer-provided weights
ωji for checking each of the commands a
j
i (see Appendix C.1). Let the weights are given by:
Ωc = {ω1c , ω2c , ω3c}. As we shall see in Section 6.4.1, the weights are used to determine which




c = 2, then SCATE
tends to check setEncR(val) twice more times that the other two commands. The checking for a
1
c
and a2c involves to check whether the speed value is within a given bound (e.g., val ∈ [v−, v+]) and
for a3c the checking module verifies if the cmd value is consistent so that the rover is within the
line and correctly follows the mission. I now consider the case when checking all three requests
does not comply with the timing requirement of τc and we can only verify at most Ki = 2 requests
(I describe how to calculate the value of Ki for each task τi in Section 6.4.2). Therefore, the
possible combinations for perform checking are as follows: Xc = {(a1c , a2c), (a2c , a3c), (a1c , a3c)}. For
each instance of the task τc, SCATE randomly selects any j-th element from the set Xc with
probability xjc that provides better “monitoring coverage”. For example, let x1c = x
2
c = 0.25 and





verifying both a2c and a
3




c is 50% (recall that by
assumption we can check only 2 commands per job). In the following section I present my ideas to
compute these probabilities using game-theoretical analysis.
6.4.1 Generating Randomized Schedules
I now present our techniques to derive the probabilities for selecting random subsets of commands
to be checked. The formulations this section assumes that the size of feasible subset of commandsKi
— that ensures all timing requirements are met — is known for each task. In Section 6.4.2 I present
algorithms to derive Ki. I model the selection of a subset of commands (for checking) as two-player
normal-form game (also called leader-follower game) [26, 114, 115]. The game formulations allow
the designers to model the fact that an attacker acts with knowledge of defender’s actions and
thus reacting accordingly. Since normal-form games address the challenges posed by my context
(i.e., selecting optimal actions for decision-making agents), I use this game model in SCATE for
generating randomized schedules.
Game Setup
In my model I consider two players: the system designer and the adversary. Let Xi denote the
set of all combinations of choosing Ki subset of commands from total Ni number of possibilities,
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= Ni!Ki!(Ni−Ki)! . In game-theoretic terminology Xi represents
the set of designer’s “strategies”. As we discuss in the previous section, the j-th element
of Xi is a vector of size Ki that represents which subset of commands will be picked for
inspection. Let us now introduce the variable Qi that represents the attacker’s set of actions.
The set Qi represents the possible combinations of actuation requests invoked by τi that an
adversary can compromise. Recall from the rover example where the controller task τc invokes
Nc = 3 actuation requests, the adversary can pick one of the following eight combinations:
Qc = {(a1c), (a2c), (a3c), (a1c , a2c), (a2c , a3c), (a1c , a3c), (a1c , a2c , a3c), (∅)}. For example, the first element in
the set denotes the adversary chooses to compromise only invocation a1c , the fifth element implies
both a2c and a
3
c are compromised while the last element implies there is no attack in the job during
this instance of the task. Note that the size of the attacker’s strategy set Qi is 2
Ni .
Recall that each actuation command aji is associated with a designer-given weight ω
j
i (see
Section 6.2.2 and Appendix C.1). The higher weight for a given command implies that designers
want to check the corresponding command often. For instance, from the rover example designers
may want to check navigation commands (a3c) more frequently than the ones that set the wheel
speeds (a1c , a
2
c) and may set higher weight for ω
3
c . Let Λ(X
j
i ) denote the set of commands used
for vetting and Ψ(Xji ) is the set of corresponding weights in the j-th element of the strategy
set Xi. Likewise Λ(Q
l
i) denotes the set of commands and Ψ(Q
l
i) is the corresponding set of
weights compromised by the attacker in its l-th strategy. In the rover example, if we select j = 2
and l = 4 (i.e., second and fourth elements of the designers and adversary’s strategy set) then
Λ(X2c ) = {a2c , a3c}, Ψ(X2c ) = {ω2c , ω3c} and Λ(Q4c) = {a1c , a2c}, Ψ(Q4c) = {ω1c , ω2c}. I now introduce
two variables, viz., system reward (λ) and system cost (ζ). Higher system reward and lower cost is
good for the designers and bad for the attackers. Likewise, higher system cost and lower reward is
favorable for the adversary’s point of view (and bad for the designers).
If a task τi selects the j-th element from set of strategies Xi and the attacker selects the l-th
strategy from Qi for attack then the system reward is λ
j,l
i and cost is ζ
j,l
i . If the task selects a subset
of commands for vetting in its j-th strategy and the adversary also attacks those invocations in its
l-th strategy, i.e., Λ(Xji ) = Λ(Q
l
i), it implies that the attack is detected. Hence, I set λ
j,l
i a large
positive value (i.e., high system reward, since the attack is detected) and ζj,li a large negative value
(i.e., no system cost). In contrast, if Λ(Xji ) ∩ Λ(Qli) = ∅ for any pair (j, l), i.e., Λ(X
j
i ) does not
contain any commands in attackers l-th strategy Λ(Qli), that implies the compromised commands
are not vetted (i.e., the intrusion is not checked). In this case I set λj,li a large negative value (i.e.,
no reward) and ζj,li a large positive value (i.e., high system cost).
When the above two conditions do not hold (i.e., only a subset of the compromised commands are
checked) and therefore ∃(j, l) such that Λ(Xji ) ∩ Λ(Qli) 6= ∅, I then obtain the system reward/cost
by normalizing the weights of both adversary and designer’s strategies. For this, I define the reward





































. This reward and cost functions give me one way to measure the security of
the system in terms of how many significant invocations SCATE can monitor given an attacker’s
strategy. Higher system reward (and lower cost) implies that SCATE performs more checking with
respect to a given adversarial action.
Formulation as an Optimization Problem
I now develop models to determine the optimal strategy for each of the tasks. Let me now
denote xji is the probability of selecting j-th element from Xi (represents the proportion of times
in which a strategy j is used by the task τi in the game). The output of the game will provide us
the probability distribution of (randomly) selecting subset of Ki commands from the set possible
choices (i.e., Xi) for the different instances of a given task τi. For a given adversarial strategy l,












i ) gives us the total system
reward and cost, respectively.
We can obtain probability distributions of selecting elements from Xi for a given attacker strategy
l (that maximizes the system reward) by forming a linear optimization program. In particular, for
each of the attacker’s l-th strategy (where 1 ≤ l ≤ |Qi|), I compute a strategy for the τi such that
(i) playing l-th strategy is a best response from the adversary’s point of view (i.e., more system
cost) and (ii) under this constraint, the strategy maximizes the reward for τi (i.e., checks critical




















xji = 1 (6.5)
xji > 0, ∀j ∈ [1, |Xi|]. (6.6)
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The objective function in Eq. (6.3) maximizes the total system reward. The constraint in
Eq. (6.4) ensures that the current (e.g., l-th) strategy results in higher cost for the attacker when
compared to other adversarial strategies. The constraint in Eq. (6.5) ensures the sum of probability
distributions equal to unity and the last constraint in Eq. (6.6) ensures non-zero probabilities so
that all combinations of the actuation commands from Xi can be selected.
Let [xji ]j=1:|Xi|(l) denote the solution obtained from the linear programming formulation for
the l-th adversarial strategy. Then, from all feasible strategies l (where 1 ≤ l ≤ |Qi|) I choose








The variables [xji ]j=1:|Xi|(l
∗) obtained by solving the corresponding linear program gives us the
probability distributions of selecting Ki subset of commands from total Ni commands. The game-
theoretical analysis allows me to show that the probability distributions obtained by solving the
l∗-th linear program will be optimal for the task τi (i.e., maximizes system reward) [26, 115].
For a given strategy l, the above linear programming formulation can be solved using standard
off-the-shelf optimization solvers [129, 130] in polynomial time. Since the strategy set Qi is finite
by definition, we can calculate the optimal probability distributions (i.e., [xji ]j=1:|Xi|(l
∗)) in finite
amount of time since it is polynomial in the total number of adversarial strategies.
6.4.2 Calculating the Size of the Feasible Command Set
My focus here is to examine as many actuation commands as possible while meeting real-time
guarantees. The game formulation from the previous sections assumes that I know the size of the set
Ki and calculate the probabilities accordingly. However, in a system with multiple real-time tasks,
finding the size of feasible set Ki for each task τi ∈ Γ while also meeting the real-time requirements
(deadlines) is a non-trivial problem. I therefore develop an iterative solution for finding the size of
this set.
My proposed solution works as follows (refer to Algorithm 6.1 for a formal description). In Lines
1–4, I first fix Ki = N
min
i ,∀τi and check the whether all tasks meet their timing requirements (i.e.,
finish before their deadlines). If there exists a task such that it fails to meet timing requirements,
I report that it is “infeasible” to integrate SCATE in the target system while satisfying designer
specified QoS requirements (Line 7). This infeasibility result provides hints to the designers to
update or modify system parameters (e.g., number of commands, QoS requirements) to enable the
ability to check actuation commands in the system. Otherwise (i.e., RTEEi ≤ Di), I optimize the
number of commands a task can verify in an iterative manner (Lines 9–18). To be specific, for
a given task τs I perform a logarithmic search (see Algorithm 6.2 for the pseudo-code) and find
the maximum number of commands K∗i that can be verified within the range [N
min
i , Ni] such that
all low-priority tasks τl meets their timing requirements (Line 11). If the selected parameter K
∗
i
is less than the total commands Ni, I then use game theoretical-analysis from Section 6.4.1 and
obtain probabilities of randomly selecting K∗i commands (in each task instance) from a total of
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Algorithm 6.1: SCATE: Parameter Selection
Input: Input taskset parameters Γ
Output: For each task τi, the size of the feasible set K
∗
i ≥ Nmini and
selection probability xji , j = 1, · · · , |X
∗
i | for each of the combinations in the strategy set X∗i ;
Infeasible otherwise.
1: /* Check minimum feasibility requirements */
2: for each τi ∈ Γ do
3: Set Ki = N
min
i and calculate response time R
TEE
i using Eq. (C.3)
4: end for
5: /* Unable to integrate SCATE with minimum QoS requirements */
6: if ∃τi such that RTEEi > Di then
7: return Infeasible
8: end if
9: for each task τi (from higher to lower priority order) do
10: Find maximum K∗i ∈ [Nmini , Ni] such that all low-priority tasks τl meet their timing requirements (i.e.,
RTEEl ≤ Dl)
11: /* not all the commands can be examined — obtain parameters for non-deterministic checking */
12: if K∗i < Ni then
13: Determine the strategy set X∗i for K
∗






obtain probabilities xji by solving the game formulation
14: end if
15: Update response time RTEEl for each τl that executes with a priority lower than τi
with the updated size K∗i
16: end for
17: /* return the solution */
18: return the size of the feasible set K∗i and
probability xji of selecting j-th strategy (j = 1, 2, · · · , |X
∗
i |) from X∗i
for each task τi ∈ Γ
Algorithm 6.2: Calculation of Maximum Feasible Actuation Requests for a Given Task
τi




i := Ni, K
c
i := 0
2: Set K̂i := {Nmini } /* Initialize a variable to store feasible values */
3: while Kli ≤ Kri do






5: if ∃τl ∈ lp(τi, πp) such that τl is not schedulable with Ki = Kci then
6: /* Decrease verification load to make the taskset schedulable */




9: /* Taskset is schedulable with Kci */
10: K̂i := K̂i ∪ {Kci } /* Add Kci to the feasible list */
11: /* Check schedulability with larger Ki for next iteration */










Ni commands (Line 14). The above process is repeated for all the tasks and the algorithm finally
returns the corresponding selection probabilities (Line 20).
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Figure 6.6: Sequence of steps involved in the SCATE operation: when the tasks generate actuation
requests (e.g., ioctl() calls), the commands are first received by the scheduler and then (randomly)
selected requests are transferred to the secure enclave for checking.
6.5 EVALUATION
In this section I first present my implementation details (Section 6.5.1). I then show the viability
of SCATE (i) using four realistic cyber-physical case-studies (Section 6.5.2) and (ii) generated
workloads for a broader design-space exploration (Section 6.5.3).
6.5.1 Implementation
I implemented SCATE on Raspberry Pi 3 Model B [106] (equipped with 1.2 GHz 64-bit ARMv8
CPU and 1 GB RAM). I selected Raspberry Pi as my implementation platform since (a) it supports
a commodity TEE (ARM TrustZone), (b) existing literature [15, 45, 62, 131–133] has shown the
feasibility of deploying cyber-physical applications on Raspberry Pi and (c) it provides a robust
development environment that allows me to analyze the viability of my approach on multiple
realistic off-the-shelf cyber-physical systems under a common platform. In my experiments I
considered both motors (DC as well as stepper) and servos as actuators. I used the Adafruit
motor shield [134] (an I/O extension daughter-board for Raspberry Pi) that allowed us to control
multiple actuators using the I2C interface. For controlling motors and servos I used an open-
source motor driver [135] and servo controllers [136]. I implemented trusted execution modes using
the OP-TEE [127] software stack that uses GlobalPlatform TEE APIs [137]. OP-TEE provides
a minimal secure kernel (called OP-TEE core) that can be run in parallel with a rich OS (e.g.,
Linux). I used Ubuntu 18.04 filesystem with a 64-bit Linux kernel (version 4.16.56) as the rich
OS and executed CheckAct() functions in the OP-TEE secure kernel (version 3.4). The controller
and checker codes are written in C for compatibility with the OP-TEE APIs. For accuracy of my
measurements I disabled all the frequency scaling features in the kernel and executed RP3 at a
constant frequency (i.e., 1.2 GHz, the maximum supported clock speed). This was to ensure that
values observed in different trials were consistent.
The linear programs were solved using the Python-MIP library [130] with CBC solver [138].
SCATE operates at the scheduler-level (see Fig. 6.6). When a task generates actuation requests
(i.e., ioctl() calls, see block 1○ in Fig. 6.6), the real-time scheduler randomly selects a subset
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Table 6.2: Summary of My Implementation Platform
Artifact Configuration
Platform Broadcom BCM2837 (Raspberry Pi 3)
CPU 1.2 GHz 64-bit ARM Cortex-A53
Memory 1 Gigabyte
Operating System Linux (NW), OP-TEE (SW)
Kernel version Linux kernel 4.16.56, OP-TEE core 3.4
Interface I2C
Boot parameters dtparam=i2c arm=on, dtparam=spi=on, force turbo=1,
arm freq=1200, arm freq min=1200, arm freq max=1200
of commands (block 2○). In particular, from the probabilities obtained by the game model
(Section 6.4.1), SCATE uses the roulette-wheel selection technique [139] for selecting a random
subset of commands at runtime (i.e., for each instance of a task). My implementation uses a
standard C random number generator. However, this does not preclude the use of other hardware-
supported generators such as Z1FFER [140] and OneRNG [141] to ensure tamper-proof true random
number generation and further improve the security of SCATE. For each of the selected commands,
the scheduler then transfers the control to the secure enclave (i.e., OP-TEE) for checking (blocks 3○
and 4○ in Fig. 6.6). For each of my case-studies, I implemented the CheckAct() as an OP-TEE
trusted application. The implementation and details of CheckAct() for the each of platforms is
presented in Section 6.5.2. I note that my implementation using Raspberry Pi, Linux and OP-
TEE serves as a good proof-of-concept and can be extended with other OS, hardware platforms
and TEE architecture without loss of generality. My implementation code is available in a public
repository [116]. Table 6.2 summarizes system configurations and implementation details.
6.5.2 Experiments with Realistic Cyber-Physical Platforms
I chose four realistic real-time cyber-physical platforms as case-studies to evaluate the efficacy of
SCATE: (a) ground rover, (b) UAV flight controller, (c) robotic arm and (d) syringe/infusion pump
that are used in many cyber-physical applications. These are off-the-shelf platforms and I did not
modify them. I note that unlike generic applications, there are few publicly available open-source
real-time platforms due to their proprietary nature (see more in Chapter 7). In addition, there
is a significant amount of effort involved in setting up a TEE-supported real-time cyber-physical
platform and generating evaluation traces from it. I therefore limit ourselves to four real-time
platforms in this paper — albeit they cover a wide range of application domains (see Table 6.1)
and should suffice to demonstrate the feasibility of my approach.
Since I focus on scheduling independent actuation checking events, the type of attacks and
checking techniques are orthogonal to my model. For demonstration purposes, I use fault
injection [142, 143] to mimic malicious behavior and trigger attacks that are known to the checking
module (i.e., CheckAct() function). Note that this is a standard technique used by the researchers
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to evaluate security solutions in cyber-physical applications [13, 17, 44, 46, 62, 143]. I now present
the evaluation platforms used in our experiments. Table 6.3 summarizes the properties of each of
these systems and attack/detection techniques used in my experiments.
• Case-Study #1 (Ground Rover): My first case-study platform is a ground rover
introduced in Section 6.2.3. There are two motors attached to the rover wheels (e.g., actuators in our
context). I used an open-source implementation of the rover controller (written in Python) [144]
and ported it to C for compatibility with OP-TEE APIs. The rover performed a line-following
mission where it moved from a source to a target way-point by following a line. Each instance of
the controller task first set the speed of the motor for the wheel movements and then steered (e.g.,
forward, left or right) based on its position on the line.
Actuation: The rover has four actuation commands: two for setting the speed of both of the wheels
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and two for issuing navigation commands to the two motors attached to the wheel. Table 6.3 lists
these actuation commands.
Attack and Consequences: I injected a DoS attack [62] that arbitrarily sets a high speed for one of
the motors (to destabilize the rover and move it away from the line). This attack can deviate the
rover form its way-points (or even crash it) due to the imbalance in the wheel speeds.
Detection: In my setup the CheckAct() functions validates as to whether the rover speed is within
designer-given predefined thresholds [145] and verifies whether the navigation commands were
consistent with the rover position. I detected the DoS attack by checking the bounds on the speed
(i.e., 70–100 decimal values [145]) issued by the controller task.
• Case-Study #2 (Flight Controller): My second case-study is a flight-controller for quad-
copter [146]. The original controller code is developed for Arduino platforms. Since Arduino
boards do not support TrustZone, I adapted it to execute on Raspberry Pi and OP-TEE enabled
environments. In this setup the controller executes a PID control loop using the Ziegler–Nichols
method [147] and sends pulse width modulation (PWM) signals to spin each of four motors (i.e.,
actuators) connected to the propellers.
Actuation: There are five actuation commands: one for setting the PWM frequency and other four
are for sending PWM pulse durations for each of the motors to rotate the copter propellers. The
CheckAct() functions verified whether the PWM frequency and pulse durations sent to each of the
motors were within a certain range (obtained from PID control logic).
Attack and Consequences: For this case study I considered a parameter corruption attack [17] that
modifies the control parameters (e.g., the PID control coefficients) at runtime and sends incorrect
pulse values to the front-right motors. This attack can suddenly turn off/freeze the propellers. As
a result, the copter will instantly fall/crash.
Detection: This attack is detected since I verify the PID parameters and corresponding PWM pulse
durations.
• Case-Study #3 (Robotic Arm): My next case-study platform is a robotic arm used in
manufacturing systems. The movement of the robotic arm is controlled by four servos (actuators
in our context). Each servo is connected to a specific “channel” (I/O port) in the Adafruit motor
shield. I use an open-source Python-based robot controller [148] and adapted the implementation
for my C-based setup.
Actuation: The robot performed an assembly line sequence with the following four actuation
operations: PICK(), MOVE(), DROP() and RESET() that (i) picks an object from first position,
(ii) moves the arm to a final position, (iii) drops the object and, finally, (iv) resets the arm to
initial position (to pick up another object). Each operation takes a (channel, angle) pair that
controls the rotation of the corresponding servo to the desired angle (45◦ in my setup [148]).
Attack and Consequences: Used a synchronization attack [143] that destabilizes the assembly line
by preventing the robot from resetting its arm back to the initial position. To demonstrate this,
I injected a logic bomb that sets an incorrect angle value in the RESET() operation (e.g., servo
channel 3). This attack can collapse the whole assembly line since the arm is not returned to the
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initial position and hence is unable to pick up objects queued in the line.
Detection: CheckAct() detects this attack since it asserts that each servo can only move up to a
certain designer-provided angle (45◦) for each of the operations.
• Case-Study #4 (Syringe Pump): My final case-study platform is a syringe/infusion
pump [149]. In our experiments I considered a bolus delivery use-case [131, 150] where the syringe
pump first pushes a certain amount of fluid (PUSH event) and then pulls the trigger back (PULL
event). The syringe movement is controlled by a stepper motor. Since the original implementation is
for Ardiuno platforms (and does not support TrustZone), I modified the codes to make it compatible
with Raspberry Pi and its motor driver library.
Actuation: For a given fluid amount, the syringe pump implementation selects the number of steps
where the PUSH and PULL events should be called. I considered each of the PUSH/PULL events as
actuation requests since they set the direction of motor rotation. In my setup there were seven
actuation requests: one for setting the motor rotation frequency and six for PUSH and PULL events
(three each). PULL events were called after all three PUSH operations were completed.
Attack and Consequences: I implemented a bolus tampering attack [131, 143] where the adversary
injects more fluid than is required (i.e., more that three PUSH events). The attack has serious safety
consequences and is a health hazard since it can inject more fluids/medications to the patient body
than the permitted amount.
Detection: This attack is detected by CheckAct() since it verifies the motor frequency and how
many times each of the PUSH/PULL events are called.
Experience and Findings. In my study I compare SCATE against another scheme that
checks all the actuation commands. I refer to this latter technique as the “fine-grain” checking
scheme. Note that in fine-grain checking, there are more context switches between normal and
secure execution mode since all the commands are checked. The goal of my experiments was to
study the trade-offs between security and real-time requirements. I therefore considered the subset
of commands selected for checking were no more than 50% of the total number of commands so
that tasks can finish before their timing requirements (see Table 6.3)5 (i.e., K = b0.5Nc) and
assumed equal weights for all commands. I note that my implementation is modular and can be
easily adjusted with different weight values. Table 6.4 lists the total number of commands (N) and
subset of commands (K) for each of evaluation platforms. I now discuss the results of applying
these schemes on the case-studies and address the following research questions (RQs):
• RQ1. How quickly an intrusion can be detected by SCATE when compared to the fine-grain
scheme?
• RQ2. What are the performance impacts and runtime overheads of these schemes?
5I also carried out additional experiments to show the effect of varying this parameter (see Section 6.5.3).
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Ground Rover 4 2
Flight Controller 5 2
Robotic Arm 4 2
Syringe Pump 7 3





































































Figure 6.7: Delay in detecting an intrusion (in terms of number of jobs) for SCATE in comparison
with the fine-grain scheme. On average (horizontal line), the detection delay is no more than 3
task instances for my case-study platforms.
Security Analysis
In the first set of experiments (Fig. 6.7) I analyze the delay in detecting the attacks: between
SCATE and fine-grain scheme. The workflow of my experiments for each of the platforms was
as follows: for a given platform and for each of my experiments (x-axis of Fig. 6.7) I triggered
the attack at random points in time (i.e., during the execution of the victim task) and measured
the time delays (in terms of number of task instances, y-axis in Fig. 6.7) when the corresponding
CheckAct() function detected the attack. In the fine-grain scheme, the time to detect an attack is
upper bounded by the sampling interval (period), Ti (i.e., requires at most one task instance). For
a given platform, each point (x̂, ŷ) in Fig. 6.7 represents the delay in detecting an attack (when
compared to fine-grain checking) at the x̂-th experiment trial is no more than ŷTc time units (i.e.,
requires ŷ additional task instances) where Tc is the period of the corresponding controller task (see
Table 6.3). The horizontal line in the figure shows the mean detection delay. From my experiments,
with 1000 individual trials for each of the four platforms, I found that the mean and 99th-percentile
detection delay were 1–3 and 3–12 sampling intervals, respectively (refer to Table 6.5 for exact
values). I note that this delay in detection results in improve response time and reduced resource
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Figure 6.8: Execution time of the main controller task for different schemes. The plots show
99th-percentile values observed from 1000 individual trials. Red horizontal lines represent task
deadlines. Fine-grained checking requires more time to compute (due to additional checks and
context switching overheads) and often derives the system in unsafe states.
usage (see more in the following experiments) and that could be acceptable for many real-time
applications.6
Key Findings: SCATE can provide similar-level of security when compared to the fine-grained
checking since on-average it requires only 1–3 additional task instances to detect the attacks.
Timeliness and Overhead Analysis
The physical system will remain stable if the controller task can finish execution before its next
periodic invocation. As a reference, I also compare with traces from vanilla execution scenario when
there is no verification of actuation commands (i.e., tasks are always running in the rich OS). I refer
to this vanilla execution as “unsecured” since it does not protect the system from any adversarial
actions. Figure 6.8 shows the execution time (y-axis) for all three schemes (captured using the Linux
clock gettime() function and the CLOCK PROCESS CPUTIME ID clock). The vertical line represents
the deadlines, i.e., if the response time of the task is above the margin, the task misses its deadline
and the physical system will became unstable (and hence unsafe). Both the fine-grained and SCATE
increase response times when compared to the unsecured scheme since there is no context switch
between Linux and OP-TEE in the latter. I note that the increase in computing resources due to
integration of additional security checking/protection techniques (e.g., cryptographic operations,
memory isolation, intrusion detection, control flow integrity checks) is an expected side-effect to
improve security as observed in prior work [10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 124].
The fine-grained scheme expends more time (than SCATE) since it verifies all N actuation
commands, i.e., there are more context switches (from rich OS to secure enclave) and runtime
6I discuss this topic further in Chapter 7.
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Figure 6.9: Empirical CDF of the CPU load. On average, SCATE uses 30.48%–47.32% less CPU.
checking overheads. As a result, the controller task can easily miss its deadline and drive the
system into an unsafe state for all of my case-studies. In contrast, intermittent checking (SCATE)
allows the tasks to finish within deadlines. I note that since, by definition, task response times
must be less than their periods for stability requirements (Appendix C.1), the controller tasks must
be required to execute with a slower frequency (i.e., longer period) if we want to enforce fine-grain
checking. For many control systems sampling rates affect the control performance [33]; therefore
by selectively checking only a subset of commands, designers can improve task response times and
control frequencies while ensuring stability of the physical system.
Key Findings: Fine-grained checking increases execution time and the controller tasks fail to
comply with their timing requirements. SCATE manages to complete execution before the deadline
of the tasks.
In the final set of experiments (Fig. 6.9) I show the resource usage (i.e., CPU load) for all three
cases for each platform in our evaluation. For that, I executed the controller tasks independently for
60 seconds and observed the CPU load using /proc/stat interface. I report the results from 1000
individual trials. The x-axes of Fig. 6.9 show the CPU load and y-axes show the corresponding
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The vertical line shows the average CPU usage. From
my experiments I found that SCATE increases CPU usage by 1.5–3.2 times when compared to
unsecured scheme – this is expected since vanilla execution does not provide any security guarantees
(and there is no context switch overhead). I also note that SCATE reduces CPU load by 30.48%–
47.32% when compared to the fine-grain scheme; this could be useful for many applications (say
for battery operated systems to improve thermal efficiency).
Key Findings: In comparsion with fine-grained checking, on average, SCATE uses 30.48%–47.32%
less CPU for its operation.
Remarks. My experiments on the four real platforms conclude that SCATE results in slight
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Table 6.5: Comparison with Fine-grain Checking: Summary of Findings







Mean 99th-p (%) (%)
Ground Rover 1 3 49.69 37.58
Flight Controller 2 8 59.81 47.32
Robotic Arm 3 12 42.80 30.48
Syringe Pump 2 8 56.81 42.87
Table 6.6: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Values
Number of processor cores, P 4
Number of tasks, M [12, 40]
Task periods, Ti [10, 1000] ms
Number of actuation requests, Ni {[3, 5], [8, 10]}
Minimum requests verified per job, Nmini d0.2Nie
Verification overhead, Coi 10% of Ci
degradation in security (e.g., mean detection delay is at most 3 jobs) while provide significant
savings in task response time (i.e., guarantees stability) and resource usage. Table 6.5 summarizes
my findings (i.e., delay in detection as well as reduction in execution time and CPU usage) for all
four experimental platforms. As we see in the experiments, there is a trade-off between security
and real-time requirements. For instance, the fine-grain checking scheme can detect the intrusions
faster (i.e., requires at most one additional instances) when compared to SCATE. However it results
in the controller tasks taking significantly longer time to finish (i.e., can make the system unstable)
and consume more resources (e.g., CPU, battery, memory). By using the mechanisms proposed
in SCATE, designers can now measure such trade-offs, evaluate the cost of integrating security
and customize the number of security checks for each task that provides the best balance between
real-time and security guarantees.
6.5.3 Simulation-based Evaluation
I also developed an open source simulator [116] and conducted experiments with randomly
















































































High: Ni [8, 10], i








Figure 6.10: Utilization vs coverage ratio. The upper bound represents the fine-grained checking
where all the commands are verified. SCATE can provide at least 50% coverage per instance if the
system utilization is no more than 70%.
Workload Generation
I considered P = 4 cores and each taskset instance contained [3P, 10P ] tasks. To generate
systems with an even distribution of tasks, I grouped the tasksets by base CPU utilization7 from
[(0.01 + 0.1i)P, (0.1 + 0.1i)P ] where i ∈ Z, 0 ≤ i ≤ 9. Each utilization group contained 500 tasksets
(i.e., a total 10 × 500 = 5000 tasksets were tested). I assumed that the tasks were partitioned
using the first-fit strategy [101]. I only considered the feasible tasksets (i.e., the response times
are less than deadlines for all tasks) — since tasksets that fail to meet this condition are trivially
unschedulable. Task periods were generated according to a log-uniform distribution where each
task had periods between [10, 1000] ms. I assumed rate-monotonic priority ordering (i.e., shorter
period implies higher priorities) [80]. For a given number of tasks and total system utilization, the
utilization of individual tasks were generated using Randfixedsum algorithm [108].
I further assumed that for each task τi, the overhead for checking each actuation command (C
o
i )
is no more than 10% of task execution time Ci (i.e., C
o
i = 0.1Ci). I considered two actuation
command request scenarios: (i) medium (Ni ∈ [3, 5], ∀τi) and (ii) high (Ni ∈ [8, 10], ∀τi). I also
assumed equal weights for all actuation commands and the minimum number of checking Nmini
was at least 20% of total number of requests (i.e., Nmini = d0.2Nie).
Results
In the following experiments (Fig. 6.10) I study how many commands each task can verify
per instance in SCATE. For this, I introduce a metric called “coverage ratio” (CR). The
CR metric shows us how many actuation commands (over total number of commands) we can












≤ CR ≤ 1 |Γ| is the total number of tasks and the parameter Ki is obtained
from Algorithm 6.1 (see Section 6.4.2). Notice that CR = 1 (i.e., upper bound) is the fine-grain
7Recall from Section 4.3.1 that the utilization of a task is given by the ratio of its execution time to period [80].
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Figure 6.11: Real-time and security trade-offs: low coverage ratio (i.e., when fewer commands are
checked in each task instance), while increasing the acceptance ratio (left plot), can lead to increase
in detection time (right plot). I set the number of actuation commands at Ni = 5.
checking case since it verifies all the commands. Let me now define base-utilization of a taskset





, Ci is the task
execution time and Pi is the period. The x-axes of Fig. 6.10 show the base-utilization and y-axes
show coverage ratio for both medium (top plot) and high (bottom plot) actuation scenarios. From
my experiments I find that SCATE provides similar level of security when compared to fine-grain
scheme if the total utilization is no more than 60% and 40% for medium and high actuation request
scenarios, respectively. I note that while fine-grain checking can provide better coverage, this upper
bound is otherwise unattainable (specially for high utilization cases) since the all the tasks may not
meet their timing requirements. This is seen in my additional experiments (Fig. C.1). In contrast,
SCATE can provide at least 50% coverage even in high utilization cases (e.g., UP ≤ 0.7), when
fine-grained checking fails and makes system infeasible.
Key Findings: The performance of SCATE is identical to the fine-grain scheme for low-to-medium
system utilizations (i.e., able to check all actuation commands). For higher utilizations, SCATE
manages to check more than 50% and 25% of the total actuation commands in each task instances
for the medium and high scenarios, respectively.
In the last set of experiments (Fig 6.11) I show the trade-off between real-time and security
guarantees. For this, I use the “schedulability” metric — a useful mathematical tool developed by
the real-time community to analyze whether all activities of a given system can meet their timing
constraints even in the worst-case behavior of the system [23]. A given taskset is considered as
schedulable if all the tasks in the taskset meet their timing requirements (i.e., response time is less
than or equal to deadline). If the tasks are not schedulable, the system will be in unsafe state
(and should not be deployed). The x-axes of Fig. 6.11 show coverage ratio. The y-axis in the left
figure shows the increase in schedulability in SCATE when compared to fine-grain scheme while
the right figure shows the detection time (in terms of number of task instances) for both of the
schemes. As I mentioned earlier, in the fine-grain scheme, the detection time for a known attack
is upper bounded by the period of the task (i.e., requires at most one additional instances when
compared to the insecure base-case). As we see from the figure, there is a trade-off between real-
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time and security requirements: lower coverage ratio increases the schedulability (since there are
lower checking overheads) but increases the detection times. This is because if coverage ratio is low,
only a few commands are selected for checking during each instances and a vulnerable/compromised
command will only be verified infrequently; thus resulting longer detection times. I also carried out
additional experiments (Appendix C.3) to study the trade-offs of integrating TEE-based SCATE
mechanism in existing real-time platforms. My results (see Fig. C.1 in Appendix C.3) show that
there is a cost of integrating security (since it reduces the number of tasks that meets their timing
requirements).
Key Findings: If we perform fewer checks in each task instances, we can accommodate more tasks
in the system (i.e., result in higher acceptance ratio). However, this may result in delayed detections
(e.g., on average, requires eight additional task instances) since not all the actuation commands
are frequently checked.
Summary. My experiments reveal interesting trade-offs between real-time and security
requirements. Fine-grain checking — while providing better security guarantees (i.e., lower
detection time) — can negatively affect schedulability and, hence, safety and integrity of the system.
SCATE, in contrast, provides better schedulability guarantees (especially for high utilization cases)
but may be result in slower detection times. By using my approach, designers of the systems can
now customize their platforms and selectively verify actuation commands based on application
requirements.
6.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I present a framework, SCATE, to enhance the security and safety of the time-
critical cyber-physical systems. I use a combination of trusted hardware and the intrinsic real-time
nature of such systems and propose techniques to selectively verify a subset of commands that
provides a trade-offs between real-time and security guarantees. I believe that my technique can
be incorporated into multiple cyber-physical application domains such as avionics, automobiles,
industrial control systems, medical devices, unmanned and autonomous vehicles.
The techniques presented in Chapters 4–5 support a part of my dissertation hypothesis
(Section 1.1) by presenting software-based time-aware security integration techniques for both,
single core (CONTEGO) and multicore (HYDRA/HYDRA-C) platforms. Chapter 6 further
bolsters my claims and demonstrates the efficacy of a hardware/software-based co-design approach
(SCATE) to integrate security in single/multicore-based real-time CPS. Hence, the combined
frameworks developed in Chapters 4–6 affirm my dissertation hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
My frameworks presented in Chapters 4–5 are not focused towards any specific security
mechanisms and allow designers to integrate any given technique based on application requirements.
Depending on the actual operation of the security tasks, a particular (class of) attack may or may
not be detectable. For instance CONTEGO, HYDRA and HYDRA-C may not detect a zero-day
exploit for some security tasks.
The underlying detection algorithms in security tasks could raise false positive errors that may
cause CONTEGO to switch modes unnecessarily. Again, a clever adversary may remain undetected
and provide a fake indication of malicious activity. This may cause CONTEGO to frequently
switch modes thus reducing performance and availability. Although CONTEGO guarantees that
the system will remain schedulable (and hence safe) even with mode changes (refer to Section
4.5.3), running of security tasks in the ACTIVE mode could impose additional overheads (i.e.,
increased load as we have seen in Fig. 4.5) that designers of the system may want to avoid. The
false-positive/false-negative errors can be mitigated by carefully designing the detection algorithms
based on application requirements. Further, I argue that forced mode changes would require an
adversary to intrude into the system and remain undetected for a long time. In practice that could
be difficult and unlikely in the presence of several intrusion detection tasks.
The security mechanism presented in Chapters 4–5 will collapse if the adversary can compromise
all the security tasks. To do so, the adversary would need to intrude into the system, remain
undetected and monitor the schedule [63] (to override the security tasks) over a long period of
time. While compromising all the security tasks could be difficult in practice, it nevertheless would
be worthwhile to check the integrity of the monitoring mechanisms, thus further improving the
security posture of the systems. This is an interesting research problem by itself and I investigate
this in Chapter 6. In particular, SCATE executes security checks (that verify actuation commands)
inside a trusted enclave (ARM TrustZone) and ensures that the protection mechanisms can not be
tampered.
Note that checking rules (i.e., State → Action matching) used in SCATE are generally derived
from system requirements/specifications and SCATE is compatible with existing techniques [122,
123]. My current implementation aims to block malicious commands. Other strategies could involve
the raising of alarms and/or sending out buffered (or even predetermined) alternate commands. I
intend to incorporate these features in future work. Chapter 6 assumes the existence of a “perfect”
checking module given by the system engineers (i.e., an attack is always correctly detected by
the CheckAct() function). Depending on the actual implementation, CheckAct() functions may
result in false-positive/false-negative errors. My model can also handle such cases by incorporating
the detection inefficiency factors in the calculation of reward/cost metrics. For example, if the
detection accuracy of CheckAct() is 95%, one way to express reward and cost functions is as
follows: λImperfect = (1− .05)λ and ζImperfect = (1 + .05)ζ, respectively.
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While SCATE imposes delays in detection (e.g., on average 1–3 task instances when compared
to the scheme that checks all the actuation commands), this could retain the safety and normal
operations of the plant due to physical inertia. For example, consider a simplified drone example.
If an adversary sends false commands and turns off the propellers, the drone’s altitude will not
instantaneously drop to zero. Hence, although SCATE may not detect the attack instantly, it can
still block spoofed commands and prevent the drone from crashing. I present additional results
and discuss this topic further in Appendix C.4.
In this dissertation I consider fixed-priority scheduling scheme for real-time tasks — since this is
the scheduling policy used in a majority of the practical systems. Real-time researchers also propose
other schemes such as dynamic-priority [80], global [23] and randomized schedules [43, 151]. My
proposed schemes can also be adapted to different real-time scheduling techniques by modifying
schedulability conditions and response time expressions. Customizing the proposed frameworks for
other scheduling policies, however, require further research.
Although I demonstrate my ideas on various realistic real-time platforms, the lack of real-time
benchmarks is one of the major challenges in evaluating real-time cyber-physical security solutions.
This is partly because of the diversity of such applications and software/hardware platforms as
well as their hardware-dependent nature. In addition, critical cyber-physical applications are
rarely open-sourced for safety/security/proprietary reasons. As a result, existing real-time security
research is mainly evaluated by using simulations [10, 11, 19, 20] and/or limited case studies [12–
15, 18, 39, 40, 62, 83, 152–154].
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Modern real-time embedded systems have evolved in a complex manner due to autonomous
systems and cloud-like transparent infrastructure. They are also increasingly facing serious security
problems. There is a need for a multi-layered, systematic, engineering approach to secure such
critical systems. In this dissertation I develop frameworks to integrate security into legacy real-time
cyber-physical platforms. I start with a hypothesis that there exist security monitoring mechanisms
(such as those check filesystems integrity or verify actuation commands) that can be integrated into
real-time CPS using timing-aware techniques. I validate my hypothesis by developing solutions
that can integrate independent, periodic security monitoring tasks by imposing scheduler-level
constraints — for both, single core (Chapter 4) and multicore platforms (Chapter 5) — without
compromising timing/safety guarantees of existing tasks. I further propose a hardware/software
co-design approach (Chapter 6). The framework proposed in Chapter 6 prevents attacks that falsify
actuation commands by (a) leveraging hardware-assisted security extensions (to ensure integrity
of security checks) and (b) applying scheduling and game theory-based optimization techniques (to
comply with timing/safety requirements). I demonstrate the efficacy of my integration mechanisms
in practical cyber-physical platforms and analyze the design trade-offs — both, from security and
real-time perspectives. I believe that solutions developed in this work will help the designers to
characterize security of systems. It is my intent that this dissertation work will guide future research
efforts and ultimately improve the security of this field.
Correctness of the Dissertation Hypothesis. The aim of this dissertation is to show that
a given set of designer-provided security monitoring techniques can be adapted for real-time CPS
without compromising timing/safety requirements of existing tasks. Recall from Section 1.1 my
dissertation hypothesis states that it is possible to integrate security into real-time cyber-physical
systems by a careful (task/scheduler-level) analysis of, and co-design with, system constraints, viz.
software, hardware and timing requirements. My dissertation work has provided the means to
analyze each of the constructs mentioned in the hypothesis. Chapters 4–5 impose scheduler-
level constraints to integrate security monitoring tasks. I use intrusion detection mechanisms
as security tasks and demonstrate the efficacy of my integration techniques using (a) a custom
intrusion detection task (Chapter 5) as well as (b) off-the-shelf integrity checking tools such as
Tripwire [60] and Bro [69] (Chapter 4–Chapter 5). I further combine hardware-assisted security
features (ARM TrustZone [25]) with scheduling/optimization techniques and develop solutions that
prevent falsification of actuation commands while retaining real-time guarantees (Chapter 6).
The techniques developed in this work show that it is possible to integrate security in real-time
CPS by imposing time-aware, scheduler-level constraints (Chapters 4–5). I further demonstrate the
feasibility of hardware/software-based co-design approaches to integrate security in cyber-physical
applications without compromising real-time requirements (Chapter 6). Therefore the conjugated
techniques presented in Chapters 4–6 hold my dissertation hypothesis.
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Table 8.1: Recommended Security Integration Techniques for Various Scenarios
Constraints Recommended














Lessons Learned and Recommendations. The techniques proposed in this dissertation
analyze various real-time vs. security trade-offs. For instance, the ACTIVE mode in CONTEGO
can detect intrusions faster but it requires more resources and delays execution of other low-priority
tasks. Likewise, we can ensure better responsive by migrating the security tasks to empty cores
at runtime (HYDRA-C) but it increases number of context switches. Selective checks in SCATE
result in improved timing and QoS guarantees but comes with a cost of delayed detection.
The frameworks presented in Chapter 5 does not require low-level modifications in the system
kernel. Therefore it is possible to deploy continuous security monitoring techniques (e.g., HYDRA-
C) using scheduler interfaces provided by the real-time kernels (e.g., RT PREEMPT [100]). I note
that publicly available real-time Linux schedulers do not support adaptive mode switching such as
those proposed in Chapter 4. One way to provide adaptive switching is to develop userspace plugins
(e.g., by using the Linux /proc interface [155, Ch. 6]) that can interact with the scheduler and
switch the execution mode at runtime depending on application requirements. I further note that
at present OP-TEE [127] is the only open source, well-documented, active project for developing
TrustZone-enabled applications in Linux. Therefore it is required to use the interfaces provided by
the OP-TEE developers to integrate off-the-shelf TEE-based checking mechanisms in Linux-based
real-time applications.
Based on the techniques developed in this dissertation, I have the following recommendations
(listed in Table 8.1) to integrate security in real-time CPS.
• If (a) the security monitoring mechanisms are independent of real-time tasks and (b) the
underlying CPS platform does not support trusted enclaves, then CONTEGO and HYDRA-
C are the suitable frameworks for securing single and multicore-based real-time platforms,
respectively.
• If (a) the security checks depend on the actions of the real-time tasks and (b) they require
tamper-proof execution, designers can adapt techniques similar to that presented in SCATE
to integrate security in their target platform.
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8.1 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
I now highlight possible directions to extend the solutions proposed in this dissertation for a
comprehensive security-aware real-time framework.
Non-preemptive Execution. My frameworks allow security tasks to be preempted (by other
higher-priority real-time or security tasks) at any point of time. There exist cases when some of the
security tasks may need to be executed without preemption. For instance, consider a security task
that scans the process table and has been preempted in the middle of its operation. An adversary
may corrupt the process table entry that has already been scanned before the next scheduling
point of the security task. When the security tasks are rescheduled, it will start scanning from its
last known state and may not be able to detect the changes in a timely manner. When security
tasks need to perform special non-preemptive operation, the priority of the task can be increased
to a priority that is strictly higher than all of the real-time tasks. I note that the cost of non-
preemption (by means of priority inversion) will compromise the timing constraints of some (or
all) of the real-time tasks. Hence, schedulability analysis needs to consider this. Besides, The
scheduling policy should identify which real-time or security tasks can be dropped (or perhaps
reschedule to other cores) to provide better trade-off between real-time system performance and
defense against security vulnerabilities.
Dependency and Reactive Security. The solutions proposed in this dissertation work in a
proactive manner. Another direction is to design security integration techniques that react, based
on anomalous behavior. Hence the executions of security checks require to follow certain precedence
constraints. For instance, consider a security task checks runtime of real-time tasks. Because of
intrusions (or perhaps due to other system artifacts) the monitored task is not behaving as expected.
Therefore the security task may perform additional actions to identify the root cause of the problem
(e.g., it may check the list of system calls, to see if any undesired calls are executed). In such cases
we may not independently execute the security tasks in parallel into multiple cores. One way to
support such a feature is to consider the dependency between security checks (e.g., checking of
system calls depends on runtime behavior of monitored task).
Integration of Cryptographic Primitives. The game theory-based formulation used in
Chapter 6 can be extended to other real-time security use-cases. For instance, consider a distributed
CPS where real-time nodes periodically exchange messages that need to be encrypted/authenticated
(say to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks) [10, 11, 39]. While longer key sizes can provide better
encryption, it requires more time to perform crypto operations (hence less number of messages
can be secured and/or tasks can miss deadlines). By using game formulations similar to those in
Chapter 6, designers of systems can use different (perhaps smaller) key sizes for different messages
(to reduce overhead) that provides maximal security from an external observer’s point of view while
guaranteeing timing requirements.
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Performance Metrics. In this work I use time-to-detect an intrusion as a performance metric
to observe how well the security checks can perform desired monitoring and detection. While
time-to-detect is a useful metric, it is hard to quantify in a comprehensive way as it depends on
a number of factors (such as the efficacy of monitoring tasks and the kind of intrusion) and is a
lagging metric. I believe that identifying and designing better security metrics is an important and
challenging research problem.
Response and Recovery Mechanisms. A key reason for detecting attacks early is to provide
enough information to system operators so that they can respond to and recover from attacks.
Systems with real-time requirements often use autonomous, decision making algorithms for
controlling elements in the physical world and there is a need for automatic recovery (on the
detection of an attack). The techniques proposed in this work do not consider the after-effects of
an intrusion. We need further studies to design autonomous attack detection, isolation and response
algorithms for safety-critical real-time embedded systems.
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APPENDIX A: CONTEGO – SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
A.1 LINEAR LOWER-BOUND SUPPLY FUNCTION AND SCHEDULABILITY
CONSTRAINTS
For the security server with unknown capacity Q and replenishment period P , I derive the lower
(upper) bound of Q (P ) that makes security tasks running under server schedulable by using
periodic server model introduced in literature [84, 85, 156]. The key idea from previous work
is that a task τi can be schedulable if minimum supply for the server can match the maximum
workload generated by τi and hp(τi) during a time interval t. If the server task τS is scheduled by a
fixed-priority scheme, the minimum supply of the server is delivered to the security tasks when its
(k − 1)-th execution has just finished with minimum interference from the high-priority real-time
tasks τj ∈ ΓR. Then, the subsequent executions of k-th release are maximally delayed by the
higher-priority real-time tasks. For this minimum supply, we can parameterize the linear lower-
bound supply function lsbfS(t) with the period and execution time of higher-priority real-time
tasks.
The worst-case response time of the server is the longest time from the server being replenished
to its capacity being exhausted with the maximum interference from the high-priority real-time
tasks, given that there are security tasks ready to use all of the server’s available capacity. In order
to calculate exact response time of the server, I use the formula introduced in existing work [157].
Using this exact method, we can calculate the maximum possible preemption on the server from the
higher-priority real-time tasks for a certain length of window and add up the server’s capacity. The
calculation is repeated iteratively by increasing the window size until the window size exceeds the
server’s relative replenishment period (in this case the system is determined to be unschedulable)
or until the window size is stable. Then, the window size is the busy period [158] and let me denote
it as wS .
The worst-case release pattern of server occurs when τS and hp(τS) is released simultaneously.
The worst-case busy period wS is the maximum time duration that the server can take to execute
full capacity Q when it is released simultaneously with the higher-priority real-time tasks, hp(τS)














S when it converges for some k.










However, such iterative methods are only amenable to brute-force approach. This is because, the
ceiling function with unknown value (e.g., the busy period) can not be in our formulation. Thus
I take a different approach by approximating ∆S . During a time interval of P , the maximum









Thus using Eq. (A.3), we can avoid the iterative calculation by assuming the number of invocation
of higher-priority real-time tasks during P , not during the exact busy period of the server. Since










Therefore, the worst-case linear lower-bound supply function of the security server during a time

















S represents the corresponding security tasksets in the representative mode (i.e., PASSIVE
or ACTIVE). In order to derive the minimum capacity that guarantees to schedule τi ∈ Γ(·)S , let me
consider the situation when τi barely meets it deadline at t = Di with the worst-case interference
from high-priority security tasks, hp(τi) ∈ Γ(·)S . Let me now define the critical instant of the security
tasks, i.e., the worst-case response time of τi when τi and hp(τi) are released simultaneously at
the end of server’s (k − 1)-th execution and suffer worst-case preemptions from k-th release and
thereafter [84]. Let me further denote Ii as the worst-case workload generated by the τi and hp(τi)
from critical instant to deadline of τi where Ii is given by:








In order to ensure the schedulability of the security task τi, the minimum supply delivered by the
server has to be greater than or equal to the worst-case workload during the time interval Di, i.e.,
lsbfS(Di) ≥ Ii ∀τi ∈ ΓS (A.8)
where lsbfS(·) is given by Eq. (A.5). Therefore, the constraints on the server supply bound to
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ensure schedulability of the security task τi can be expressed as:
Q
P
[Di − (P −Q)−∆S ] ≥ Ii. (A.9)
It is worth noting that Eq. (A.8) is only a sufficient and not necessary condition. The security
task τi can be schedulable if and only if there exists a time instance t ≤ Di such that the inequality
in Eq. (A.8) holds. I use the sufficient condition in Eq. (A.8) because the presence of time in the
necessary condition makes the proposed optimization framework inapplicable to the problem under
consideration. Despite the fact that this bound may not be exact and may incur approximation
error in the supply function, as I show in Section 4.7, it enables us to integrate security tasks
without violating real-time constraints.
A.2 SOLUTION TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
The ACTIVE and PASSIVE modes parameter selection formulations given in Section 4.5 are
constrained nonlinear optimization problems and not very straightforward to solve. Therefore I
reformulate the optimization problems as a geometric program (GP) [86]. A non-linear optimization




Subject to: fi(x) ≤ 1 i = 1, · · · , zp (A.11)
gi(x) = 1 i = 1, · · · , zm (A.12)
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xz]T denotes the vector of z optimization variables. The functions
f0(x), f1(x), · · · , fzp(x) are posynomial and g1(x), · · · , gzm(x) are monomial functions, respectively.





where ci ∈ R+ and al ∈ R. Note that the coefficient ci must be non-negative but the exponents al
can be any real number including fractional and negative.








2 · · ·x
a1l
z (A.14)
where cl ∈ R+ and ajl ∈ R. We can maximize a non-zero posynomial objective function by
minimizing its inverse.
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Period Selection using Geometric Programming Formulation






























i in the period adaptation problem are posynomials where Γ
(·)
S represents
the corresponding security tasksets in the representative mode (i.e., PASSIVE or ACTIVE).
This is directly follows from the observation that all the coefficients are non-negative and the
variables (e.g., periods) are always positive. Besides, I am only summing up positive terms and
therefore the terms are closed under addition. Since the requirement for posynomials is that it
need to be closed under addition, the above terms are posynomials.
An interesting property of posynomials and monomials is that, if f(·) is a posynomial and g(·)
is a monomial, the ratio f(·)g(·) will become a posynomial. Since
f(·)
g(·) is a posynomial, this allows
us to express the constraint f(·) < g(·) as follows: f(·)g(·) ≤ 1. For instance, we can easily handle
the constraint of the form f(·) ≤ α where f(·) is a posynomial and α > 0. We can refer f̂(·) is
an inverse posynomial if 1
f̂(·)
is a posynomial. Besides, we can maximize a non-zero posynomial
objective function by minimizing its inverse.
Based on the above description, I reformulate the maximization problem as a standard GP





























(3P (·) − 2Q(·))Ti−1 ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S (A.17)
T desi Ti
−1 ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S (A.18)
(Tmaxi )
−1Ti ≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S (A.19)
where for any symbol y(·) represents the corresponding variable in the representative mode (e.g.,
PASSIVE or ACTIVE).
The above GP formulation is not a convex optimization problem since the posynomials are
not convex functions [86]. However, it can be converted into a convex optimization problem
using logarithmic transformations (i.e., based on a logarithmic change of variables, as well as
a logarithmic transformation of objective and constraint functions). In particular, by using
logarithmic transformations (i.e., representing T̃i = log Ti and hence Ti = e
T̃i , and replacing
inequality constraints of the form fi(·) ≤ 1 with log fi(·) ≤ 0), I convert the above formulation into
a convex optimization problem. This convex optimization reformulation is solvable in polynomial
time by using standard algorithms, such as the interior-point method [87, Ch. 11].
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Selection of Server Parameters
Theorem A.1. The objective functions (i.e., the ratio between server capacity and period) and the
server schedulability constraints (i.e., Eq. (4.15) and Eq. (4.20)) can be expressed in posynomial
form.
Proof. The proof follows by rearranging the terms in posynomial form and transform the objective
functions into minimization expression. Let me rearrange the objective function (i.e., ratio between
capacity and period) as QP−1 which is clearly a posynomial. The objective functions in P4.4 and






where Q(·) and P (·) represent the server parameters in PASSIVE and ACTIVE modes. Note that
Eq. (A.20) is also in posynomial form. Let me now rearrange server schedulability constraints as
follows:
(Q(·) + ∆S(·))P







(P (·) + Th) · T−1h · Ch. (A.22)
Since the optimization variables (e.g., capacity and replenishment period) are always positive, using
the similar argument presented in Observation A.1, I can assert that Eq. (A.21) is a posynomial
constraint. QED.
In order to express the schedulability constraints for the security tasks (i.e., Eqs. (4.16) and
(4.21)) as as posynomial form the me rearrange the equations as follows:
P (·)(Q(·) + Ii) + ∆S(·)Q
(·)
Q(·)(Q(·) + T ∗i )
≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S . (A.23)
Recall that, if we want to represent the constraint of the form f(·)g(·) ≤ 1 the denominator must be
monomial. However, the inequality in Eq. (A.23) does not conform to a posynomial form due to the




+QT ∗i . The following theorem
illustrates how the constraints on server bound can be represented in posymonial form.
Theorem A.2. The server bound constraints can be formulated as the following posynomial form:[





Q(·) · ĝ(Q(·), T ∗i )
]−1
≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S . (A.24)
Proof. The theorem is proved by using the geometric mean approximation [159, Ch. 2] of
posynomials. Since the denominator in Eq. (A.23) is a posynomial, let me approximate Q + T ∗i
with a monomial by the following geometric mean approximation.
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Let me denote Q+T ∗i as g(Q
(·), T ∗i ) = u1(Q
(·)) +u2(T
∗
i ) where u1(Q
(·)) = Q(·) and u2(T
∗
i ) = T
∗
i .
We can approximate g(Q(·), T ∗i ) with


















and y0 ∈ R+ is a constant that satisfies ĝ(y0, T ∗i ) = g(y0, T ∗i ). The
approximated monomial ĝ(Q(·), T ∗i ) can be rewritten as















. Using this monomial approximation, I represent Eq. (A.23) as:
P (·)(Q(·) + Ii) + ∆S(·)Q
(·)
Q(·) · ĝ(Q(·), T ∗i )
≤ 1 ∀τi ∈ Γ(·)S (A.27)
and the proof follows.
QED.
Likewise, the real-time task schedulability constraints for the ACTIVE mode (e.g., Eq. (4.18))















D−1j ≤ 1, ∀τj ∈ lpR(τ
ac
S ). (A.28)








i and replacing the
inequality constraints fi(·) ≤ 1 with log fi(·) ≤ 0), the objective function and the constraints
become a standard convex optimization problem that is solvable in polynomial time.
I also present another approach and carry out additional experiments to obtain server parameters
by exhaustively searching all possible period and capacity values. My findings are presented in the
following section.
A.3 COMPARISON WITH EXACT METHOD
I now compare the GP-based approach with an exhaustive search method1 based on exact
analysis. In this exhaustive search, I assign server replenishment period from 1 to Pmax with
a granularity of δ. For each period, I determine the minimum capacity requirements that makes
the tasks schedulable. From the set of feasible period and capacity pair, I take the pair that
maximizes the server utilization. Notice that, the minimum server capacity Qmin(τi, P ) for τi ∈ ΓS
1Similar search method has also been discussed in literature [67, 84, 156].
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Figure A.1: Normalized percentage of the number of schedulable task-sets. The base-utilization of
the real-time tasks were varied from [0.01+0.1·i, 0.1+0.1·i] where 0 ≤ i ≤ 8, i ∈ Z. The utilizations
of the security tasks were generated from [0.11, 0.20]. For exhaustive search, I set Pmax = 2500
with search granularity δ = 0.5.
with a given P can be obtained by solving the quadratic inequality in Eq. (A.9), which is given
by:
Qmin(τi, P ) =
−(Di − P −∆S) +
√
(Di − P −∆S)2 + 4IiP
2
. (A.29)









where wS is obtained from Eq. (A.1). In order to find the minimum required capacity of the server
for a given replenishment period P , I take the maximum of the capacity Qmin(τi, P ) over all the
security tasks τi ∈ ΓS which is defined as:
Qmin(P ) = max
τi∈ΓS
{Qmin(τi, P )} . (A.31)
Hence any Q from [Qmin(P ), P ] such that Q + ∆S ≤ P will be the feasible capacity (i.e., makes
the task-set schedulable).
In Fig. A.1 I compare the number of schedulable task-sets found in the proposed method and
exhaustive search. For exhaustive search, I set Pmax = 2500 with granularity δ = 0.5. As we can see
from figure, the difference in terms of schchdulable task-sets found by exhaustive search compared
to GP increases for higher base-utilization. I attribute that due to approximation of supply function
in the security server. Recall that, the exhaustive search method calculates minimum capacity of
the server by exact analysis of the busy period. In contrast, the proposed method approximates the
interference to the server from real-time tasks during the interval of server replenishment period
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Figure A.2: Exhaustive search vs. GP-based optimization: difference in the server utilization for
schedulable tasksets. For each utilization group, I randomly generated 100 task-sets and compared
the schedulability of both schemes.
cases, as the base-utilization increases the error accumulates and reduces schedulability. However,
still it is possible to accumulate task-sets for higher base-utilization.
The quality of solution (i.e., server utilization) obtained by GP and exhaustive search is illustrated








where QEX and QGP (PEX and PGP) represent the capacity (replenishment period) obtained
from exhaustive search and proposed method, respectively. For low-to-medium utilization cases,
the difference is close to zero, which implies the quality of the solution obtained by the GP
method is similar to that of obtained by exhaustive search. However, when the utilization is
higher the exhaustive search outperforms the proposed method. Again, I attribute this due to the
approximation of supply function in the security server.
It is worth noting that the solution obtained by exhaustive search may not be optimal in a sense
that the actual replenishment period may appear beyond Pmax. As we can see from Fig. A.2,
for some task-sets the difference is less than zero, i.e., Q
EX
PEX
is lower than Q
GP
PGP
. I highlight that
the actual search region to find the optimal server parameters for exhaustive search may widely
vary based on task-set inputs; and can only be found numerically by trial-and-error. Instead, the
proposed method provides a generic approach to analyze the system that is independent of task-set
input parameters.
I note that the proposed GP-based approach can solve a given task-set in seconds, while the
exhaustive search method generally takes few minutes to couple of hours depending on the size
of Pmax and the search granularity δ. Besides, the exhaustive search method is not scalable for
task-sets with large number of tasks.
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APPENDIX B: HYDRA/HYDRA-C – SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
B.1 SOLUTION TO THE PERIOD SELECTION PROBLEM IN HYDRA
The period adaptation problem given in Section 5.3.2 is a constrained optimization problem
and not straightforward to solve. Therefore I reformulate the optimization problems as a GP [86].
Based on the concepts presented in Appendix A.2, we can represent period selection problem as




. Likewise period bound
constraint in Eq. (5.4) can be represented as T dess Ts
−1 ≤ 1 and (Tmaxs )
−1Ts ≤ 1, respectively. In








Imr (Tr + Ts)T−1r Cr +
∑
τh∈hpS(τs)
xmh (Th + Ts)T
−1
h Ch. (B.1)
The above reformulation is not a convex optimization problem since the posynomials are not
convex functions [86]. However, by using logarithmic transformations (i.e., representing T̃s = log Ts
and hence Ts = e
T̃s , and replacing inequality constraints of the form fi(·) ≤ 1 with log fi(·) ≤ 0),
we can convert the above formulation into a convex optimization problem that can be solved using
standard algorithms, such as the interior-point method in polynomial time [87, Ch. 11].
B.2 COMPARING HYDRA WITH OPTIMAL MULTICORE ASSIGNMENT
I now empirically compare HYDRA an “optimal” multicore allocation scheme. The result of
an empirical comparison of HYDRA with an optimal solution (i.e., a solution of the formulation
described in Section 5.3.1 that finds the variables X and T) is presented in Fig. B.1 where I
exhaustively searched for all possible combinations for a small setup with M = 2 cores and up
to NS = 6 security tasks. To find the optimal solution, I examined each of the M
NS possible
assignments of security tasks to cores. For each assignment, I then determined the value of the
period vector T that maximized the cumulative tightness by solving a convex optimization problem
(see Appendix B.1).
The x-axis of Fig. B.1 represents total system utilization and y-axis is the difference in cumulative
tightness (i.e., ∆η =
ηOPT−ηHYDRA
ηOPT
× 100%) for HYDRA and the optimal solution. As shown in
the figure, for low to medium utilization cases, HYDRA’s performance is similar to the optimal
solution (i.e., the difference is zero). However for higher utilizations performance degrades. This is
because HYDRA follows an iterative best-fit strategy to find the periods (and assignment). Hence
for higher utilization values the lower priority tasks may not get periods close to the desired values
(and the cumulative tightness degrades). As we see from the figure, the degradation (in cumulative
tightness) is no more than 22% and that may be acceptable given the exponential computational
complexity of finding an optimal solution.
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Figure B.1: Comparing HYDRA with optimal solution: I consider M = 2 and NS ∈ [2, 6] with
other parameters similar to that mentioned in Section 5.5.2.
B.3 PROOF OF LEMMA 5.1
Since real-time tasks are partitioned and they have higher priorities than security tasks, the
schedule of real-time tasks executed on πm does not depend on any other task in the system. Now
consider any interval [t, t+ x) of length x. I show that we can obtain an interval [t′, t′ + x) where
all tasks are released at t′, such that the workload of real-time tasks on πm is higher in [t
′, t′ + x)
compared to [t, t+ x).
First step: let t′ be the earliest time such that πm continuously executes real-time tasks in [t
′, t);
if such time does not exist, then let t′ = t. By definition, πm does not execute real-time tasks at
time t′−1. Also since real-time tasks continuously execute in [t′, t), the workload of real-time tasks
in [t′, t′ + x) cannot be smaller than the workload in [t, t+ x).
Second step: since πm is idle at t
′ − 1, no job of real-time tasks on πm released before t′ can
contribute to the workload in [t′, t). Hence, the workload can be maximized by anticipating the
release of each real-time task τr so that it corresponds with t
′. This concludes the proof.
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APPENDIX C: SCATE – SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
C.1 SYSTEN MODEL: REAL-TIME TASK AND SCHEDULING
I consider a system consists with M fixed-priority real-time tasks Γ = {τi, · · · , τM} running on
P identical processor cores Π = {π1, · · · , πP }. In this work, I consider a partitioned fixed-priority
preemptive scheduling [23] (a widely supported approach in many commercial and open-source
real-time operating systems such as QNX [99], OKL4 [98], real-time Linux [100], etc.) where tasks
are statically assigned to the processor cores using a predefined partitioning scheme. The set of
tasks running on a given core πp is denoted by Γp and Γ = ∪πp∈Π{Γp}. Each task τi is represented
by the following tuple:
(Ci, Ti, Di, Ni, N
min
i ,Wi). (C.1)
Each of the above variables represents the following:
• Ci is the constant, upper bound on the computation time, called worst-case execution time
(WCET) [79];
• Ti is the minimum inter-arrival time (period), i.e., consecutive jobs of τi should be temporally
separated by at least Ti time units;
• Di (usually less than or equal to Ti) is the timing constraint (deadline);
• Ni is the number of actuation requests that τi sends out;
• Nmini ≤ Ni is a QoS parameter that denotes the minimum number of actuation commands
that must be checked; and
• Wi = {ω1i , · · · , ω
Ni
i } is a designer-provided weight vector where the weight ω
j
i represents the
importance of j-th actuation command over other.
As we see in Section 6.4, the parameters Nmini and Wi help the designers to determine the subset
of commands to be selected in each job of the task for checking when not all Ni commands can
be checked due to timing constraints. While I represent the above task model as above for ease
of presentation, I note that not all the real-time tasks in a given system may invoke actuation
requests. For such tasks τi′ setting Ni′ = N
min
i′ = 0 and ignoring the variable Wi′ will hold the
consistency of the representation.
I consider a discrete time model [160] where the system and task parameters are multiples of a
time unit, i.e., an interval starting from time point t1 and ending at time point t2 that has a length
of t2 − t1 by [t1, t2) or [t1, t2 − 1]. I also assume that the non-secure system (i.e., when there is
no actuation command checking) is “schedulable”, that is, for each task τi ∈ Γ, the response time
(time between completion and arrival) is less than the deadline of the task.
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C.2 FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS
Let Ni be the number of actuation requests generated by τi that require vetting and C
o
i is an
upper bound of additional computing time due to (a) context switching (from normal execution
to secure enclave and returning the context back to normal mode) and (b) perform checking inside
the enclave. Then the WCET of τi can be represented as follows:
CTEEi = Ci +NiC
o
i . (C.2)
The task τi is “schedulable” if its worst-case response time (WCRT), R
TEE
i , is less than deadline,
i.e., RTEEi ≤ Di. We can calculate an upper bound of RTEEi using traditional response-time










where hp(τi, πp) ∈ Γp denotes the set of tasks that are higher-priority than τi running on core πp.
The taskset Γ is referred to as schedulable if all the tasks are schedulable, viz., RTEEi ≤ Di,∀τi ∈ Γ.






Ch denote the vanilla response time (i.e., when there is no
actuation checking). Notice that the task τi will miss its deadline if R
TEE
i > Di. From Eq. (C.3)












is the total overhead for checking the actuation commands.
C.3 DESIGN-TIME TESTS FOR INTEGRATING ACTUATION CHECKING IN EXISTING
SYSTEMS
I also performed experiments to show the impact of integrating TEE-based actuation checking
mechanisms (e.g., SCATE and the fine-grain scheme) in an existing system. For this, I use the
“schedulability” metric introduced in Section 6.5.3. To demonstrate the effect of schedulability for
a large number of tasksets with different parameters, let me now introduce the notion of acceptance
ratio that is defined as the number of schedulable tasksets over the total number of generated
tasksets (e.g., 500 for a given utilization group in my setup).
In Fig. C.1 I compare the performance of difference schemes in terms of acceptance ratio (y-






taskset utilization without any actuation checking). As expected, schedulability drops for high
utilization cases since less number of tasks meet their deadlines due to increased load. While
















































Fine-grain (Ni [3, 5])
SCATE (Ni [3, 5])
Fine-grain (Ni [8, 10])
SCATE (Ni [8, 10])
Figure C.1: Impact on schedulability: Fine-grained checking can reduce schedulability significantly
(specially if tasks have large number of actuation requests) due to increased validation overheads.










































Figure C.2: Effect of physical inertia in cyber-physical applications. The left plot shows the
expected altitudes of the drone during mission. The right plot presents the altitudes during attacks.
While there exist slight drifts in altitudes before SCATE detects false commands (shaded areas in
the right plot), it does not jeopardize the safety (i.e., the drone was above from the ground and
did not crash).
due to reduced utilization, it does not provide any security guarantee. The fine-grain checking,
while providing better security (since it verifies every request), performs poorly in terms of meeting
the timing guarantees (essentially keeping the system safe) specifically for highly loaded systems.
(i.e., less number of tasks found to be schedulable) due to more validation overheads. In contrast,
SCATE provides better schedulability with (slight) QoS/security degradation as we demonstrate
in Section 6.5.3. The designers of the systems can use the results presented here to analyze the
feasibility of integrating TEE-based checking method in their target platforms.
C.4 IMPACT OF PHYSICAL INERTIA
I now present the impacts of physical inertia to detect attacks in SCATE. For instance, consider
a simplified drone example. The baseline safety requirement for the drone is not to crash into the
ground during flight. I use existing quad-copter models [161] and simulate the dynamics of the
drone for 30 seconds (x-axes in Fig. C.2). In this mission, the drone takes-off from the ground
and then lands in the target position. The y-axes in Fig. C.2 represent altitudes of the drone (i.e.,
distance from the ground) during the mission. The left plot of Fig. C.2 shows the corresponding
altitudes over time during the normal quad-copter operation. To demonstrate malicious activity,
I injected attacks that sent false commands to turn off the propellers (right plot of Fig. C.2).
98
In particular, I triggered attacks at the following three instances, viz., (i) while the quad-copter
was ascending (at 5 sec.), (ii) in the peak altitude (at 12 sec.) and (iii) during descent (at 25
sec.). The attacks were detected by SCATE within 8 task instances (i.e., 99-th percentile values
obtained from the flight controller case-study, see Table 6.5). The vertical lines (light red) in the
plot represent time difference when an attack is triggered and when it is detected by SCATE.
As the figure illustrates, there is a slight drift in altitude before SCATE detects and blocks false
commands. However, this delayed detection does not jeopardize safety constraints (i.e., it does not
drop the drone’s altitude to zero) and the drone is able to complete the mission without crashing.
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